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The plight of people suffering from the violence and deprivation of conflict attracts a great
deal of aid. Such aid is often inspired by the thought that we have some responsibility to
protect or assist innocent victims of war. However, this humanitarian response is vulnerable
to abuse. Combatants can manipulate the supply of aid to achieve their ends, or channel
aid to provide their forces with additional food or arms, and so extend the conflict.
This poses a challenge to our obligation to assist victims of conflict: if the aid hurts more
than it helps, a reasonable response is to refrain from giving aid. This may not help people in
need, but it avoids hurting them further. A better response would be to find another means
of helping people trapped by conflict which does not risk making their positions worse.
This dissertation explores a variety of means that might enable us to help victims of con-
flict, such as redirecting aid, intervening militarily, or enacting sanctions. One promising
strategy involves removing or altering certain international rules which have a role in en-
couraging conflict. Altering these rules requires concerted advocacy and political will, but
given sufficient attention, such an approach could shorten or reduce the severity of some
conflicts, or curtail their ill effects on civilians.
ii
1 Introduction
The humanitarian response to wars in places such as Somalia, Kosovo and Liberia has gener-
ated substantial criticism from both inside and outside aid agencies. After the Rwandan geno-
cide, late-arriving aid workers found themselves protecting people who were responsible for
much of the killing during the genocide, along with innocent civilians; the genocidaires used
refugee camps in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo as secure bases from which
to strike at their enemies in the Rwandan Patriotic Front army. In Sierra Leone, the media at-
tention given to amputees spurred amputation as a calculated strategy by both sides in the war,
bringing inflows of aid that could be exploited by warlords. And in Sudan and Ethiopia, famine
relief appears to have been used by corrupt governments to suppress dissent and impoverish
parts of their population who did not support their regime.
These failures have inspired a variety of responses. For some, the challenge is to reform
the way aid is given in order to address inefficiencies and negative effects that accompany the
distribution of aid. For other critics, the danger that humanitarian aid in war zones might end
up doing more harm than good is inescapable: an unavoidable result of the dynamics of conflict
situations is that any money and resources that are spent can be seized by armed forces and
used to fuel the combat.
If the critics of aid are correct, and reform is not a viable option, it suggests that we may
do better to abandon vulnerable people in desperate circumstances rather than risk making
already-dire situations worse. But while withdrawing aid from people whose lives are at risk—
who may have lost their families, their communities and their livelihoods due to violence, and
who desperately need assistance—may avoid worsening their situation, it does nothing to help
them.
There are important philosophical reasons why it might trouble us to desert victims of war.
Most people accept that we have a moral responsibility to help people who are at a heightened
risk of death or disability, particularly due to reasons outside their control such as natural disas-
ters, severe systemic poverty, or conflict. People in especially desperate positions, such as those
who face the immediate daily risks of war, may have a special claim to assistance; however, if
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that assistance risks making their situation worse, we cannot be said to be discharging our duty
in a responsible fashion.
In this thesis, I examine a variety of objections to the suggestion that we have a duty to as-
sist people whose lives have been disrupted or threatened by war or violent conflict. I start with
an analysis of the extent of the need for assistance, our obligation to assist people in need, and
a broad overview of some objections that might motivate against us giving this aid. The work
of philosophers Peter Singer and Thomas Pogge help to demonstrate why we have an extensive
duty to help such people, and suggest answers to the most obvious objections to such a duty. I
then look in more detail at the most powerful objection: that the dynamics of violent conflict
pose a special risk when attempting to help victims, and that humanitarian aid can result in
greater harm being visited against the very people it is intended to help. I examine a number
of possible strategies that have the potential to reduce this risk. In considering the shortcom-
ings of obvious alternatives, I discuss how Pogge’s solutions might have a positive influence,
allowing us to respond to people in need without worsening their situation. I then explore how
these proposals might be enacted, and examine potential problems that these proposals might
encounter.
1.1 The extent and limits of foreign aid to victims of conflict
In conflicts of the past 50 years, aid has rarely been withheld from people affected by war: it
is estimated that US$1.4 billion was spent assisting over two million refugees from Rwanda in
1994, in the first nine months of the conflict.1 In the Balkans, the UN High Commission for
Refugees, which coordinated humanitarian (as opd to military) aid in the region, spent around
US$190 million to help half a million refugees there in the last nine months of 1999,2 and be-
tween 1991 and 2011, US$13 billion in humanitarian and development aid was spent in Soma-
1Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide:
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, volume 3: ‘Humanitarian Aid and Effects’. Copenhagen: Steering Committee
of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996, 〈http://www.oecd.org/derec/50189439.
pdf〉, p. 1.
2United Nations High Commission for Refugees, The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: An independent evaluation of UNHCR’s
emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, February 2000,
〈http://repository.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:3644〉, pp. vi, xvii.
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lia.3 Humanitarian assistance by governments has ranked at about ten percent of total Overseas
Development Assistance in recent years,4 and of the overall humanitarian aid budget of the past
ten years (from both governmental and private sources), between 60 and 80 percent has been
spent in countries affected by war.5 Around a quarter of humanitarian assistance comes from
private, voluntary sources.6
This assistance meets a real need. Mortality due to poverty-related causes (communicable
diseases, nutritional deficiencies, and maternal and perinatal conditions) in conflict zones is
twice that suffered in areas that are not active war zones, rising from about 14 to 32 percent of
all deaths.7,8
The extent of humanitarian assistance given by private sources, accompanied as it is by
widespread coverage of conflict by prominent news organisations, demonstrates that many rel-
atively affluent people, living in peaceful societies, are aware of the risks to life and livelihood
faced by non-combatants in situations of conflict, and that many of these affluent people are
sufficiently moved by the plight of innocent victims of conflict to offer help, usually by donating
money, material resources, or time.
The reasons that people give for extending help are not always rigorous or consistent with
stated goals. Some give out of a sense of compassion for the victims, but may not spend much
time ascertaining the specifics of the victims’ situation; others use the prominent media cov-
erage of particular conflicts as a marketing tool, donating in order to improve their own public
profile. As a result, the aid that is given can be unreliable or useless, or dependent on continued
3John Norris and Bronwyn Bruton, Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somalia. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, September 2011, 〈http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
security/report/2011/09/14/10286/twenty-years-of-collapse-and-counting/〉, p. 1.




7According to the World Health Organization, there were an estimated 15 million deaths in 2008 due to communi-
cable diseases, nutritional deficiencies, and maternal and perinatal conditions, or 27.5% of all deaths. Although
these causes are typically associated with poverty, the category includes illnesses that don’t specifically target the
poor. However, nutritional deficiencies alone accounted for 418 000 deaths. By contrast, there were only 182 000
deaths due to war in 2008, or 0.3% of total deaths. When we separate these figures according to whether the coun-
try in which they occurred registered deaths due to war, we see that the broad “communicable disease” category
registers twice as many deaths in countries at war (or whose armed forces are active in other countries), among a
population that is slightly smaller than that in countries with no war deaths. For nutritional deficiencies, 255 000
deaths occurred in conflict zones, against 163 000 in countries at peace.
8World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory: Cause-Specific Mortality. Geneva: World Health Organi-
zation, 2008, 〈http://apps.who.int/gho/data/〉.
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media coverage. Aid workers have reported shipments of goods such as left shoes, or discarded
household electrical items, which prove to be useless in alleviating suffering or improving the
situations of victims. Money given by compassionate people to the victims of a war might be
diverted by a large disaster elsewhere.
These issues can reduce the effectiveness of aid that is given, and when considered along
with negative unintended consequences and the ways that aid can be manipulated, they raise
legitimate questions about whether aid indeed saves lives or whether it hurts more than it helps.
A person being asked to contribute to projects that aim to help victims of conflict may ask why
he should help someone who lives in a different country, whom he has never met, particularly
when he shares no responsibility for the situation that is causing their suffering. Even if we
are able to give satisfactory answers to these reasonable questions, such a person might argue
that he works hard to earn his money; why should he give it away to other people, who haven’t
worked to earn that money?
To answer these questions, we can examine arguments that have been proposed around a
similar problem: the situation of people whose lives are threatened not by war, but by poverty.
Extreme poverty, the type of poverty that threatens lives, affects about 1.4 billion people world-
wide, causing millions of early deaths every year.9 The World Health Organization estimates that
out of a sample of a hundred people, nine more will die premature deaths in a lower-middle in-
come country than in a high income country. For every hundred people, 23 more will die early
deaths in a low income country than in a high income country.10 According to UNICEF, nearly
seven million children under five died in 2011, the overwhelming majority in poorer regions.11
In his 1972 article, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, and in books such as The Life You
Can Save (2009), Peter Singer proposes that we all have a duty to help such people who live
in extreme poverty, in the same way that we would have a duty to wade in and rescue a child
drowning in a pond. By giving money, Singer believes, we can save the lives of some people
living in extreme poverty.
9Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty. London: Picador, 2009, p. 8.
10World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory: Adult Mortality. Geneva: World Health Organization,
2009, 〈http://apps.who.int/gho/data/〉.
11UNICEF, Committing to Child Survival: A Promise Renewed. New York: UNICEF, September 2012, 〈http://www.
unicef.org/publications/index_65820.html〉, p. 7.
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1.2 Giving aid to prevent suffering due to poverty
Singer argues that we have a responsibility to help people whose lives are in danger due to their
severe poverty: children who die of hunger, for example, from lack of access to vaccinations or
basic medical facilities, or because they don’t have safe drinking water or reasonable sanitation.
In the same way that a passer-by who spots a child drowning in a pond has a moral responsi-
bility to rescue the child, even at the cost of ruining a new pair of shoes or muddying his suit,
Singer believes that we have a responsibility to help people whose lives are threatened because
of their poverty.
Singer structures his argument by establishing three premises that lead to his conclusion:
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care
are bad.
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening,
without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so.
Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death
from lack of food, shelter and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as
important.
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing some-
thing wrong.12
As Singer points out, the first premise is not controversial. Given that his argument is about
poverty, it is important to note that there is not always a direct relationship between poverty
and a reduced life expectancy due to lack of food, shelter and medical care. For example, Kerala,
a state in southern India, has high levels of poverty but also high life expectancy and low child
mortality.13 When Singer discusses poverty, he is referring not to the type of poverty where one
does not own a television or a car, but to the sort of extreme poverty that results in premature
death or disability, and the first premise reflects this specific focus.
The fact that the children who are dying of poverty usually do so at a distance, far from the
wealthy, means that their plight is easy to overlook, and people who could afford to help such
12Singer, The Life You Can Save, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
13Paul Gomberg, ‘The Fallacy of Philanthropy’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32:1, March 2002, p. 39.
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people instead spend their money on luxuries. Resources that could be used to reduce poverty
do exist: there are thousands of people with a net worth of over a billion U.S. dollars; the super-
rich own luxury yachts, private aeroplanes, and homes around the world; even those who are
much less well-off than that routinely buy expensive watches and clothes that they do not wear,
and waste billions of dollars worth of food. In the same way that we would think poorly of a
passer-by who was able to save a drowning person, but chose not to because she didn’t want to
ruin her clothing or didn’t see it as her responsibility, Singer believes that a person who chooses
not to spend some portion of his income to help someone in dire need is failing to be a good
person.
The second premise may inspire more argument than the first. One may disagree that one
has a responsibility to prevent bad things from happening to other people, or question what
counts as “nearly as important”. Both the second and third premises are vague on what we are
obliged to give. The “nearly as important” qualifier allows some scope in deciding what counts
as being as valuable as saving a person’s life, but Singer expects that few people will consider
buying a CD or a T-shirt to be as valuable as saving a life. Of course, a CD or a T-shirt can
reasonably be expected to be regarded as substantially less valuable than the life of a child, but
a parent might feel differently about the necessity of buying educational toys for his or her own
child, as opposed to spending the same money on food for a poor child in a distant country, and
Singer does not dispute that items such as educational toys may be too important to a child’s
development for a parent to consider sacrificing them.
Singer also recognises that people might be less willing to give money if they are asked
to give a great deal, and offers two differing suggestions: how much we are morally obliged to
give if following his logic in a strict sense, and a more moderate version that he believes will
still have a significant effect on poverty. The strict version is a direct logical consequence of
Singer’s argument: if you spend the money you might have otherwise spent buying a CD on the
more valuable goal of helping to feed a child, it makes sense that giving more money can help
more children. It follows that you should keep reducing any spending that is not essential, and
donating that money to the poor, until you reach a point where if you reduce your spending
any further, you will be sacrificing something “nearly as important” as a child’s life, such as
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education for your own children.14
However, Singer recognises that this is an unrealistic goal for most people—and, indeed,
if everyone were to follow suit, likely to be unnecessary. Rather than have people reject his
argument as overly demanding, he settles on a more moderate version, in which everyone who
is “financially comfortable” should give five percent of their annual income and, for the very
wealthy, substantially more.15 Singer reckons that, in addition, the top five percent of earners
should give a tenth of their income; people in the top one percent should give 15 percent of their
income; and those in the top half a percent of earners should give one-fifth of their income.16
The core of the third premise, that by donating to aid agencies you can prevent suffering,
prompts a greater objection: even if one accepts that one has a responsibility to prevent suffer-
ing and death, it is not clear that donating money to aid agencies will effect that goal. Singer
does not claim that it will prevent all suffering, just that donating a relatively small amount
might be sufficient, for example, to save the life of a child. On the other hand, the money might
not be enough to save someone’s life, and could instead be wasted on unnecessary administra-
tion or redirected into other projects. The premise gives little guidance about a range of related
questions, such as how to choose between different aid groups, each with differing priorities.
Efficiency is one metric: if three children are drowning in one pond, and one in another, all
other things being equal, we might presume that for Singer it would be better to try and res-
cue the three children. This may be an objectionable analogy, forcing us to choose between
two ghastly alternatives, but it raises questions about efficiency that are important when there
are not just four children who should be saved, but hundreds of millions who live in extreme
poverty.
1.3 The limitations of individual charity
Aid agencies today face all manner of difficult choices, of which efficiency is only a part. Al-
lowing a donor to choose a child to sponsor increases rates of giving, but the administrative
overhead of connecting the child and the sponsor means that the child gets much less help




than if the agency were to allocate money to families without ensuring the donor gets a per-
sonal response.17 If the agency were to use the money to support large infrastructure projects,
it could help even more children, but might risk losing donors, due to the lack of this personal
connection. Presumably, Singer has left the third premise open-ended to allow individuals to
select groups that they believe will prevent suffering, choosing projects that reflect particular
interests or priorities. However, the real difficulty lies in assessing how effective an aid agency
is in alleviating suffering.
Leif Wenar contrasts Singer’s approach to aid effectiveness in Singer’s original 1972 arti-
cle on the topic of aid, “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, with his approach in his 2009 book.
In “Famine, Affluence and Morality”, Singer wrote that an expert assessment of the facts about
aid was not required, because in 1972 “it was not in dispute that aid was effective.”18 As Singer
puts it, “it is [not] disputed that we can do something about [famine], either through orthodox
methods of famine relief or through population control or both.”19 By 2009, Singer acknowl-
edges that aid is not as straight-forward as it was once thought to be, and that “working out the
likely real-world consequences of aid is often more complicated than we thought. . . . Whether
the complications involve ‘Dutch disease’, bad institutions, or population growth, they intro-
duce an element of uncertainty into our efforts to provide assistance.”20 As Wenar points out,
Singer devotes a quarter of his 2009 book to assessing the facts about aid.
As part of this assessment, Singer relates a handful of anecdotes that demonstrate how ef-
fective aid can be, and suggests a number of organisations that he believes provide such aid,
or help in finding productive agencies. Singer mentions groups like Charity Navigator in the
U.S., and Intelligent Giving in the UK, which report the ratio of administrative overhead to in-
come, but acknowledges that the focus on administrative costs “tells you nothing at all about
the impact the charity is having.”21 He cites another organisation, GiveWell, as offering a more
data-driven approach to judge the quality of NGOs, but as Wenar indicates, GiveWell uses only
17See, for example, Michael Maren, The Road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity.
New York: The Free Press, 1997, p. 143.
18Leif Wenar, ‘Poverty Is No Pond: Challenges for the Affluent’, in Patricia Illingworth, Thomas Pogge and Leif
Wenar, editors, Giving Well: The Ethics of Philanthropy. Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2011, p. 123.
19Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1:3, 1972, p. 242.
20Singer, The Life You Can Save, op. cit., p. 124.
21ibid., p. 83.
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a handful of data points about the agencies it vets to arrive at the judgement. According to
the group that Singer points to as GiveWell’s top-rated organisation, a distributor of bed nets to
combat malaria, the average cost to save a life is $820, taking into account the number of bed
nets they distribute; the cost of the project; the likelihood that the nets will be used; and the
chance that a bed net will save a life.22 For Wenar, to say that this reflects the true cost of saving
a life is problematic, depending on a limited amount of information, disregarding counterfac-
tuals (if this agency had not distributed a bed net, might another have done so at lower cost?),
and ignoring the question of harm—the agency’s method of distribution may have in fact re-
duced the number of bed nets in use; some of the money in the $820 may have been redirected
into politicians’ pockets in poorly-run countries; or the fact that NGOs were distributing bed
nets might have allowed the government to side-step its obligations to its citizens, and perhaps
spend the money saved on vanity projects or arms purchases.23
As Paul Gomberg points out, there is another limit in the analogy between the situations
of the drowning child and that of people suffering from extreme poverty: it doesn’t matter to
us how the child came to be drowning. Whether he fell or was pushed, we are still required to
effect a rescue. But it may be relevant how people came to be poor: it may affect how we carry
out a rescue, and according to some views, whether we have a responsibility to help at all.24 The
consequences of rescuing a drowning child are also reasonably easy to forecast: no matter the
harm done to the child, he is alive where, had he not been rescued, he would have drowned. By
contrast, the consequences of providing aid to the poor are hard to judge.
The consequentialist basis of Singer’s argument implies that we have a duty to alleviate
poverty in a sustainable fashion. The difficulty of determining whether aid does indeed alleviate
suffering suggests that approaches to aid other than, or complementary to, the individual char-
ity that Singer advocates, might offer better results. As Gomberg puts it, “Chronic and pervasive
problems—because they are chronic and pervasive—cannot be intelligently addressed without
discovering their causes and assessing which practical approaches best address them.”25 When
Singer first laid out his argument in 1972, it was widely accepted that low levels of development
22ibid., pp. 88–89.
23Wenar, op. cit., pp. 125–126.
24Gomberg, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
25ibid., p. 47 (emphasis original).
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were due to “missing money”—lack of financial resources led to poor infrastructure that hand-
icapped poor societies—and Singer’s suggestion of donating non-essential income implies that
remedying the shortage of funds available to the poor is an essential element in any effort to
reduce poverty, but development scholars and analysts are now inclined to believe that bad or
missing institutions bear a larger part of the blame for the problems of development.26
For Gomberg, focussing on private charity and philanthropy distracts us; it “short-circuits
the deepest political analyses of the causes of poverty. It causes us to take for granted the con-
text of social relations that create poverty and inequality.”27 Similarly, Andrew Kuper believes
that “[c]haritable donation sometimes helps—and sometimes harms—but is no general solu-
tion to global poverty, and can be positively dangerous when presented as such.”28 Kuper ar-
gues that Singer’s prescriptions, giving up luxuries like foreign vacations or consumer goods,
are not always useful: in South Africa, “manufacturing exports, tourism, and other service in-
dustries are among the few successful mechanisms that have kept people from falling further
into grinding poverty.”29
Characterising spending on luxuries as wasteful misses the fact that the market in luxury
goods does affect the lives of poor people. It is not always a beneficial effect, to be sure, but a
simple view of charity as poverty relief neglects the many ways in which poverty fits into, and
is perpetuated by, features of the global system. At best, it misses many productive avenues for
improving the lives of the poor, and at worst, it allows the wealthy to congratulate themselves
on their social conscience even as the system of which they are beneficiaries forces more people
into poverty.
Singer’s analogy of the drowning child has proved controversial among a variety of thinkers,
becoming something of a distraction from the three premises that form the philosophical under-
girding of his argument as each investigates some or other important way in which the analogy
deviates from real-world examples. Nonetheless, it is useful as a thought experiment; Anthony
26Clark C. Gibson et al., The Samaritan’s Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005, p. 14.
27Gomberg, op. cit., p. 64 (emphasis original).
28Andrew Kuper, ‘Facts, Theories, and Hard Choices: Reply to Peter Singer’, Ethics & International Affairs 16:1, 2002,
p. 125.
29Andrew Kuper, ‘More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”’, Ethics & International
Affairs 16:1, 2002, p. 112.
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J. Langlois poses his objection to individual charity by reframing the analogy in a compelling
manner: the passing rescuer, having saved the child, then gathers together a group to watch the
pond, and eventually to fence or fill in the pond, and other ponds like it, to lessen the danger to
other children.30
If a number of children were to fall into the same pond, this would certainly suggest that
neighbouring people and the local authority had failed the stricken children, ignoring a known
problem that ultimately led to their endangerment and possibly death. In the same way, Lan-
glois suggests that there are other reasons to be critical of the approach of individual charity:
because there is no guarantee that aid that is available in one year will be available the following
year, it may be difficult to create sustainable projects, and because the choice to donate is left to
the individual, there is no way to be sure that the projects with the best outcomes are the ones
that are funded. The poor are not entitled as a matter of law to receive aid, so it is left to the
donors to decide which organisations to favour. The result, Langlois says, is that aid projects
“are often inappropriately structured and fail to be of sufficient size or duration to adequately
address the problem of global poverty.”31 And in some situations, aid can exacerbate the situa-
tion of the poor, encouraging or worsening dynamics that deprive people of their livelihoods or
opportunities to improve their position.
Singer recommends donating to aid agencies as the best means of alleviating poverty, but
presumably would commend any strategy that meets his basic goals, of “saving lives, reducing
misery, and meeting people’s basic needs.”32 One such approach is to propose that, in addition
to having a positive duty to assist vulnerable people, as Singer argues, we have a negative duty:
not to impose international rules that hurt the poor (along with a concomitant positive duty to
remove existing rules that hurt the poor). Like Singer, Thomas Pogge argues for a duty to the
poor, but rather than suggesting that we have a duty to help extremely poor people solely in or-
der to minimise human suffering, he believes that the poor are victims of an unjust system that
benefits the well-off. As a result, the wealthy have a duty to reform, or at least not to support,
the international rules that he suggests cause much of that poverty.
30Anthony J. Langlois, ‘Charity and Justice in Global Poverty Relief’, Australian Journal of Political Science 43:4, De-
cember 2008, p. 687.
31ibid., p. 686.
32Singer, The Life You Can Save, op. cit., p. 114.
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1.4 Pogge’s argument for social justice
Thomas Pogge argues that the current global system, designed according to the domestic in-
terests of powerful states rather than the needs of all people, and emphasising relations be-
tween states rather than between their people, qualifies as a human rights abuse due to the
harm it visits upon vulnerable people. For Pogge, “There are feasible alternative designs of the
global institutional order, feasible alternative paths of globalization, under which this catastro-
phe would have been largely avoided.”33 He uses the example of relatively recent reforms, the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, enacted in 1999, (along with the 2000 UN Convention Against
Corruption) to show one of the ways in which international institutions affect the poor. Prior to
the passage of the convention, most developed countries allowed firms operating out of those
countries to deduct bribes made to foreign officials from their taxes, “providing financial incen-
tives and moral support for the practice of bribing politicians and officials in poor countries.”34
This allowed companies pursuing public contracts in poor countries to skew the awarding of
such contracts, increasing their profits at the minor, tax-deductible cost of a few bribes, and
diverting official attention from the quality of the received goods.
The policies of powerful governments and international institutions can have a serious
effect on the lives of poor people, working to protect the positions of powerful countries and
satisfy their domestic constituencies, at the expense of people who live in poorer, less influential
countries. As Pogge points out, tens of thousands of people die every day, and millions every
year, from poor nutrition, and lack of access to clean water, medical care, shelter or sanitation.35
When one considers these deaths to be a result of global rules, as Pogge does, those rules violate
human rights, at a minimum the right to “life, liberty, and the security of person.”36
According to the logic of many of these institutions, however, these rules are legitimate
because they were agreed to by the rulers of the poorer, less influential nations; poorer countries
must therefore abide by the result. However, if proposed alternatives were even more harmful,
one might argue that this consent is illegitimate and therefore non-binding. For example, a
33Thomas Pogge, Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010, p. 50.
34ibid., p. 46.
35ibid., p. 31.
36United Nations, ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 1948, 〈http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/〉.
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poor country might accept World Trade Organization rules because, although the WTO rules
are prejudicial to its trading interests, failure to agree to these rules would make trade even
more difficult, and generate even less income for the country.
Even if it were not the case that alternatives such as not signing global agreements were
more damaging than acceding to unfair rules, the fact that these rules work to violate human
rights means that the argument for consent fails, just as, if a person gave their consent to be
sold into slavery, it would not legitimate the enslavement. As Pogge points out, “on the usual
understanding of moral and legal human rights, they are inalienable and thus cannot be waived
by consent.”37
A second objection holds that all countries, rich or poor, have a primary responsibility to
their own people, not to the citizens of other countries, or to some notion of global justice.
But if we consider the anti-bribery case, we can see the shortcoming of this objection. For
states that punish the bribing of their own officials, facilitating the bribing of officials from other
countries, and then sheltering the responsible parties and rewarding them with tax deductions,
establishes a double standard that runs contrary to the spirit of that state’s own laws. Parents
who want their children to have access to good educational opportunities are not allowed to
sabotage other children in order to achieve the best chances for their own children. And just as
citizens of a country cannot kill foreigners for financial gain, a country’s government should not
create international rules that favour domestic constituencies if, in doing so, they threaten the
lives of vulnerable people in other countries. As Pogge puts it, “partiality [to one’s own citizens]
is legitimate only in the context of a ‘level playing field’.”38
For Pogge, the result is a situation where, when people die of preventable illnesses and
poor nutrition as a result of rules that prejudice their chances of living a decent life, their rights
are violated. “It is not the gravest human-rights violation. . . because those who commit it do
not intend the death and suffering they inflict either as an end or as a means. They merely act
with willful indifference to the enormous harms they cause. . . . But it is still the largest such
human-rights violation.”39 As such, it is worthy of significant attention.
37Pogge, Politics as Usual, op. cit., p. 40.
38ibid., p. 23.
39ibid., p. 51 (emphasis original).
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The remedy may not be easy, but the situation is not hopeless: “Even now, severe poverty
could be rapidly reduced through feasible reforms that would modify the more harmful features
of this global order or mitigate their impact.”40 Pogge believes that the removal or moderation
of rules that hurt the poor—such as WTO treaty rules which allow rich countries to use tar-
iffs, domestic subsidies, anti-dumping duties and quotas to shield domestic industries from
cheaper foreign imports—would bring several hundred million people out of poverty, and gen-
erate “welfare gains in excess of $100 billion annually”.41
1.5 Integrating institutional change and individual charity
People who have grown up under rules that limit their opportunities may not have the educa-
tion or infrastructure to take advantage of better opportunities; people whose development has
been stunted by disease or malnutrition may never truly be able to compete on a level playing
field. Pogge agrees, suggesting that both reform and charitable approaches may be necessary:
“In such areas a special effort, not purely market driven, is needed to jump-start development.
It is only after people there have access to adequate food and shelter, vaccines, safe water, basic
sanitation, basic health services, and primary education that these poorest areas will attract sig-
nificant private investment, which may then be sufficient to sustain and continue the advance
on its own.”42
For Gomberg such thinking is unhelpful. The limited supply of time and money that is
available to combat poverty means that money spent on relief cannot be used to encourage re-
form on a broader scale: “both projects, relief and prevention, are so huge that in doing more
of one we do less of the other. In addressing poverty these are competing ways of using our
time, energy, and other resources. So the proposal ‘do both’ is not a viable way to defend phi-
lanthropist duties of rescue.”43
In part, this conflict between proponents of charitable donations and of institutional re-
form arises because each fears that the other’s approach will work against people fulfilling their
duty to the poor—Singer believes that a focus on systemic change will prove too overwhelming
40ibid., p. 50.
41ibid., p. 20.
42Thomas Pogge, ‘Priorities of Global Justice’, Metaphilosophy 32:1, January 2001, p. 13.
43Gomberg, op. cit., p. 64 (emphasis original).
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for individuals, causing them to ignore the problem; Kuper, Gomberg and Langlois conclude
that individual giving won’t resolve the problem, but will distract attention from the systemic
change that they believe will resolve the problem.
Gomberg’s concern about the limited nature of the time or money available to fight poverty
is most likely founded on the pitiful amounts that are currently spent on aid, but that does not
mean that the two approaches always operate in a zero-sum game—increasing the amounts
available might yield enough to address both approaches in a comprehensive manner. Singer
calculates that his suggested scheme for donations, a sliding scale based on one’s income (20
percent for the richest half-a-percent of people; 15 percent of income for the next half-a-percent;
ten percent for the remaining five percent of the richest people; five percent of income for the
top ten percent), yields $1.5 trillion each year, eight times what is estimated to be required to
meet Millennium Development Goal targets, “ample to cover not only the aid itself, but also
research and experimentation into what forms of aid work best.”44
This suggests that even by a modest standard of commitment—less than may be morally
required of us, but far more than is given at present—there are sufficient resources available to
explore a number of different approaches in addressing poverty. Singer’s concern is for people
to follow a morally decent course of action, and while we might criticise a wealthy man who
gives nothing to charity, or who supports institutional arrangements that hurt the poor, as not
fulfilling his moral duty, few people would criticise someone for giving money rather than cam-
paigning for change, or for campaigning rather than donating.
1.6 Objections to helping victims of conflict
Someone who accepts that it may be morally praise-worthy for him to give some portion of his
income to people who are in desperate need of help, or to attempt to change elements of the
international system that hurt the poor, may still raise a number of objections about helping
victims of conflict, or distant people whose lives are threatened by extreme poverty. Such a
person might argue that while such a responsibility exists, our duty to the poor does not extend
to all humanity—it is limited by distance, for example, or to those with whom we share some
44Singer, The Life You Can Save, op. cit., pp. 167–168.
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form of civic bond: only towards members of our own society, who have agreed to abide by
the same laws and political rules. Or he might argue that one has no responsibility to help
people who, through their own fault, and perhaps by disregarding earlier advice or intervention,
find themselves in a bad situation, like extreme poverty or war—perhaps a lifeguard has no
responsibility to rescue a man attacked by a shark, putting her own life at risk, if he was warned
that a shark was active in the area. A wealthy person who does not want to donate money might
say that these objections indicate that, while a person who does not rescue a drowning child has
done something wrong, we should not think poorly of someone who does not help extremely
poor people in foreign countries, or people whose lives have been badly affected by conflict.
The first objection, that our obligations are limited to those with whom we share some sort
of emotional or political bond, can exist in several varieties. Most people believe that we owe
certain duties to people related to us. Parents have well-defined obligations to children, for ex-
ample, such as feeding, educating, and clothing them, and offering them emotional support. In
many cultures, children are believed to have strong obligations to their parents as well, such as
respect or obedience. Outside the family, one might argue that one’s duties are limited by some
sort of reciprocity: we owe help only to those who have agreed to help us. We share a contract
with other members of the political organisations to which we belong: we follow the laws of our
country, protecting one another, or engaging in mutual defence when we are all threatened, or
depending on the country, providing a common purse to ensure financial or medical security,
regardless of wealth; we expect everyone else to follow those same laws in return. To the extent
that we recognise international laws, treaties and other agreements, we may have obligations
to members of other polities, but since such treaties do not extend to assisting extremely poor
people, or helping victims of conflict, our obligations in those situations should be limited.
The most obvious problem with this type of thinking is that it assumes that our political
decisions have no effect on people outside our polity. French laws, for example, don’t just af-
fect France, or members of the European Union; given the extent of their international trade
relations, the military reach of such countries, and their interests in their former colonies, laws
passed in one country can have detrimental effects on the citizens of many other countries,
in areas not covered by international laws and treaties. If the citizens of one country are to be
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held responsible for the harmful effects of their actions on non-citizens, then their obligations
cannot be limited to those with whom they share reciprocal agreements.
We can see this using another example: if someone was bleeding in the street, we wouldn’t
refuse to take them to hospital simply because they were foreign. Indeed, we would think poorly
of someone who did refuse assistance based on the victim’s citizenship. The distinction be-
tween citizen and foreigner is morally arbitrary when someone’s life is at risk. Even if our coun-
try was at war with the foreigner’s government, we would usually consider seeking medical help
for the victim to be the ethical course of action, unless helping the victim put our own life at risk.
The second objection is that we shouldn’t bear any responsibility for rescuing people from
bad situations that arise as the result of their own poor decisions. Singer’s argument arises as
a response to suffering; for Singer, innocence or culpability has no bearing on our duty to help
people who are at risk. In any case, it is not clear that this objection carries much weight when
applied to extreme poverty: one would have to argue either that extreme poverty has arisen as a
result of a series of bad decisions by the extremely poor, or that the political rules by which one
abides have no negative repercussions for the poor.45
The case for conflict is more complex. In many cases, it is not apparent that richer coun-
tries, or reasonably wealthy people in general, have any responsibility for the conflicts that
plague many countries. In some cases, detailed investigations may reveal that richer coun-
tries have played a role in encouraging rebellions, in order to effect favourable policy changes,
or to gain control of resources at cheaper prices. But in others, the conflict may reflect entirely
indigenous disagreements, without the support or encouragement of foreign parties.
Even if the conflict is entirely local in origin, it does not follow that the victims of the con-
flict are responsible. It would be strange to say that we should not help children whose families
have been killed in a war because they are share political responsibility for the conflict, even the
children of soldiers or corrupt political leaders. For victims who do share some sort of political
responsibility, such as supporting a rebellion that could reasonably have been foreseen to cause
damaging conflict, it still does not necessarily follow that we should not help someone whose
45There is evidence to suggest that the contrary is true. Oxfam’s “Make Trade Fair” campaign, launched in 2002,
claims that for every dollar given in aid by rich countries, two were stolen by unfair trade practices. These include
restricting market access by poor countries; dumping of government-subsidised products from rich nations on
poorer countries; and forced liberalisation of poor markets, removing protection for growing industries.
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life has been endangered by their own bad decisions. It is reasonable to suggest that people
bear the consequences of their poor decisions: we may be justifiably loathe to provide food to
soldiers who volunteered for a conflict which has resulted in the collapse of the local economy.
But in some situations, practical issues should override blame. For example, providing food
and other assistance might convince such soldiers to lay down arms. In other situations, it may
be difficult to judge culpability for a conflict: aggressors may themselves be press-ganged vic-
tims, or the false promises of political leaders may have obscured the better judgement of their
supporters.
A stronger objection to assisting victims of conflict is that the positive effects of aid are not
long-lasting, or that aid turns out to be of no help at all, or even ends up hurting victims. For
example, if you give refugees or internally-displaced people food or shelter, it may save their
lives for a day or a month, but since the conflict continues, their lives will be equally at-risk
once the donated food has run out, or once combatants return to their area and steal or destroy
the shelter. Giving aid is unsustainable; a temporary break in aid-giving, whether due to donor
fatigue or simply because a port is blockaded or a supply plane shot down, is enough to threaten
lives once more.
In the next chapters, I shall first discuss why victims of conflict are especially deserving of
assistance, and examine the problem that this objection raises in more detail: why injecting aid
into war zones is particularly problematic. I then look at ways in which it might be possible to
assist people threatened by war without diverting money from places where it could be used
more cost-effectively, to help more people.
18
2 The Problems of Aid During Conflict
Singer and Pogge’s arguments consider the circumstances of people in situations of life-threatening
poverty. But given our limited resources, it is inevitable that we have to make hard choices as
to whom to help first. “If we can rescue only some small percentage of people”, Langlois asks,
“should we pick and choose among them—the healthy, the productive, the smart, the most
likely to survive anyway? Or. . . should we treat all as equal and therefore simply help those
we come across first until our resources are depleted? Or should we prioritise the worst off,
those suffering the most? Clearly these differing possibilities go to the core of our basic moral
intuitions.”46
In some situations where the need for assistance is most urgent, aid that is given is less
efficient than it might be in less desperate circumstances, where it could help more people.
Pogge has argued that, in order to make a morally adequate decision about whom to help first,
an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) that tackles poverty must take into ac-
count four constraints: the seriousness of the harm that a person suffers (where a person whose
life is in danger is considered to be at immediate risk of more serious harm than a person who
is prohibited from voting, for example); the amount of harm that they suffer (where a person
who lives below the poverty line is more in need of help than a person who also lives below
the poverty line, but earns twice as much as the first); the number of people who suffer (where
there is more moral value in helping a greater number of people than a small number); and
the amount of money that needs to be spent to alleviate the harm, or the risk of harm (that is,
cheaper projects should be preferred, because more people can be helped).47
Pogge aggregates these four principles as follows: “Other things being equal, an INGO
should choose among candidate projects on the basis of the cost-effectiveness of each project,
defined as its moral value divided by its cost. Here a project’s moral value is the harm protec-
tion it achieves, that is, the sum of the moral values of the harm reductions (and increases) this
project would bring about for the individual person it affects.”48
46Langlois, op. cit., p. 689.
47Thomas Pogge, ‘Moral Priorities for International Human Rights NGOs’, in Daniel A. Bell and Jean-Marc Coicard,
editors, Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 222–228.
48ibid., p. 228.
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When we consider people who are most vulnerable, and have an especially heightened
need for assistance, there is good reason to believe that those who have been negatively affected
by conflict and war should hold a special priority. The nature of conflict is such that civilians
in these situations are often reduced to poverty—although it is possible to earn a great deal of
money in wartime, it is usually through force or the threat of violence, rather than by pursuing
peace-time professions. Added to the problem of poverty, people caught in war zones face a
high risk of death due to violence, and frequently suffer the loss of family members and friends
in the conflict, and the loss of community structures (from national government to charitable
and self-help associations) that provide stability, and, in many cases, assistance to the worst-
off. While the global problem of poverty is undoubtedly larger than the problem of civilians in
war, the amount and seriousness of the harm that civilians in conflict situations face, owing to
the threat of mortality and the deprivation inherent in their situation, suggests that refugees
and people affected by conflict have need of assistance that is of at least of equal priority to the
need experienced by most suffers of extreme poverty, and arguably of a greater priority.
However, many argue that the results of the investment in humanitarian aid in conflict
zones to date has not simply been insufficient, but has been ineffective. Michael Maren, writing
about unregulated, uncontrolled intervention in Somalia, described it as “a tumour. . . set loose
in a body without an immune system.”49
The critical problem that faces suppliers of aid in any conflict situation is the combination
of a dearth of resources, most of which are redirected into the war, and the lack of reasonable
enforcement of basic laws. As a result, aid that is sent to an area of conflict is a prime candidate
for resource-starved warriors, offering a host of potential financial and strategic opportunities
to commanders who can manipulate or commandeer the resources that aid provides. In addi-
tion, the lack of an effective law enforcement structure often means that aid can be misused, or
can worsen a situation of conflict without being manipulated by fighters.
49Maren, op. cit., p. 218.
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2.1 Financial gains for combatants
Looting of aid resources is one of the most obvious strategies open to militants. Aid, whether
in the form of money, food, or other resources, has to be transported to an area in which it is
needed, often through rough terrain. Transport convoys can be diverted, in whole or in part,
with relatively little risk to soldiers. Many aid organisations reject the use of protection such
as armed guards, leaving them vulnerable to hijackings or looting at checkpoints. In refugee
camps in Goma, set up for Rwandans in the Congo in 1994, some aid organisations estimated
that Hutu militias in the camps stole 60 percent of aid supplies, either for their own use, or to
sell to other refugees.50
According to Michael Maren, in Somalia, the looting of humanitarian aid became the rea-
son for the conflict: “In fact, it was the petty nature of the Somalia dispute—small men lusting
after power and loot—that made the conflict so intractable. There were no issues, no ideolog-
ical differences, nothing to negotiate. As long as the UN remained in Somalia, it continued to
supply the raw material of the conflict: loot.”51
When aid organisations do use armed guards, they can become vulnerable to protection
rackets, as, in many cases, the only people sufficiently well-armed to fight soldiers in a war zone
are other combatants. Control of scarce resources, like protection and transport, combined
with a willingness to use force, leaves belligerents in a position of power over humanitarian
organisations, who may not have the resources to organise independent means of transport or
protection for themselves or the people they are trying to help. In Somalia, outraged over the
looting of resources, some aid groups hired local guns to protect their aid convoys. On occasion,
the gunmen they hired would themselves hijack the convoys.
Looting can take a slightly different form, that of taxation. Combatants can control access
to vulnerable populations, or to particular areas, and may demand a share of goods entering
the area they control. Others may require money in exchange for allowing medical staff access
to areas in which they hold power, for example, limiting the reach of immunization campaigns
or life-saving operations. Linda Polman recounts a conversation with a Sierra Leonean rebel
50Linda Polman, The Crisis Caravan: What’s Wrong with Humanitarian Aid? New York: Picador, 2010, p. 30.
51Maren, op. cit., p. 251.
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calling himself “Colonel Vandamme”: “‘The white men are soon gonna need drivers, security
guards, and houses. We’re gonna provide them. . . Them NGO wifes done reach already for
come count how much sick and pikin [children] de na di area.’ The rebels call aid workers
‘wives’ because they care for people. ‘I told them they couldn’t just come here and do that.
They’re my pikin and my sick. Anyone who wants to count them has to pay me first.”’52
Governments involved in warfare can use legitimate taxation to appropriate a share of hu-
manitarian resources for their war effort. Even legitimate humanitarian aid given to govern-
ments, and spent on healthcare or education, can have a similar effect. Limited government
resources, instead of being spent on healthcare, can be redirected to military spending. Paul
Collier estimates that around 11 percent of aid money leaks into military spending in this man-
ner. This implies that up to 40 percent of poor governments’ military spending is derived from
aid money.53
Another strategy that can take advantage of aid for a government’s benefit is currency con-
trol and exchange manipulation. By setting a high rate of exchange, governments can bring
additional foreign currency into their country. Aid itself may be imported free of charge, but
taxes levelled when it arrives will usually be paid in foreign currency. In addition, humanitarian
organisations in a war zone will have to pay for services and goods they need to operate. Ex-
change rate manipulation allows a poor country to reap additional benefits from humanitarian
involvement, benefits that may not be used to help vulnerable people. As the 2006 Nobel Peace
laureate Muhammad Yunus has written, “we’ve learned that when aid is free, not only do the
poor get the least of it, but everyone inflates their needs.”54
2.2 Strategic gains for combatants
Aid can also be manipulated in ways that offer strategic, rather than financial, benefits. Con-
trol of aid can be used to influence population movements, concentrating people in particular
areas. In Ethiopia, much of the 1984 famine was the result of a strategic campaign of starva-
tion by Mengistu Haile Mariam’s government, forcing people to move to different areas of the
52Polman, op. cit., p. 165.
53Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. London: The Bodley Head, 2009, pp. 111–112.
54Muhammad Yunus, ‘A Hand Up Doesn’t Always Require a Handout’, Wall Street Journal, 14 October 2006, 〈http:
//online.wsj.com/article/SB116078038541792551.html〉.
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country, in part to disrupt support for the Tigrayan Peoples’ Liberation Front. During Operation
Lifeline Sudan, implementing an agreement in 1989 between the Sudanese government, rebel
forces, and the United Nations, the government would prohibit shipments of aid except to spe-
cific areas, leading to widespread starvation in other regions. Refugees and rebels would gather
in the areas that had received food, and the government would launch attacks against them,
killing rebels and capturing food aid.55 According to Raymond Bonner, writing in the New York
Times in 1998, “nearly a decade and more than $2 billion later, the situation is virtually identi-
cal, despite what Operation Lifeline describes as one of the largest relief operations ever. The
impoverished in southern Sudan are still starving and dying, and the war goes on.”56
In situations where humanitarian agencies have access to stronger forces than rebel groups,
the protection racket can be reversed, with combatants acting as refugees, using camps as safe
havens, bases for their combat operations, and recruiting stations. After the Rwandan genocide
of 1994, Hutu militias and politicians notoriously controlled many aspects of life in the refugee
camps of Goma, in the former Zaire. Polman sketches the level of organisation:
The exodus from Rwanda has not been a defeat but a tactical withdrawal. They
hadn’t moved to Goma because they were beaten but to avoid defeat: in the refugee
camps they were safe from the Tutsi army, which wouldn’t follow them over the bor-
der.. . . The Hutu leaders created prefectures in the camps, which they subdivided
into communes and sectors, which, in turn, were divided into districts and subdis-
tricts. . . . On all food rations distributed by aid organizations, the Hutu government,
from its tourist hotels, levied a “war tax” to pay its army. . . The inhabitants of the
camp, well-rested, well-nourished and inoculated, were a source of new recruits.. . .
Almost every night, militias crept back over the border into Rwanda to go “hunting
Tutsi.”57
No one in the international community wished to intervene in the struggle between Hutu and
Tutsi, to hold the Hutu genocidaires in the camps accountable, or to separate civilian refugees
55See, for example, Polman, op. cit., pp. 123–130.
56Raymond Bonner, ‘Aid for Sudan’s Hungry Keeps War Well Fed’, New York Times, 11 October 1998, 〈http://www.
nytimes.com/1998/10/11/world/aid-for-sudan-s-hungry-keeps-war-well-fed.html〉.
57Polman, op. cit., pp. 25–27.
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from “refugee-warriors”.
One of the most pernicious ways in which aid leads to counter-productive results is by the
creation of perverse incentives for belligerents (or, indeed, for vulnerable civilians, although
here I concentrate on combatants’ responses to aid). Séverine Autesserre records the conse-
quences of the focus on rape as a weapon of war in the Congo. The emphasis on rape in the
Congolese conflict, beginning with a 2002 report by Human Rights Watch that drew attention
to the issue of sexual violence, has grabbed headlines and elicited attention for the conflict be-
cause of its emotional impact. The focus on sexual violence brings extra resources to bear on
the problem (which may be no bad thing, even if it leads to some neglect for other forms of
violence used in the conflict), but it also signals to combatants that, in order to gain attention,
they need to create as much sexual violence as possible. Autesserre gives the example of the
August 2010 mass rapes in Luvungi:
A local militia called Mai Mai Sheka, which allied with the foreign rebel group the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, gang-raped 387 civilians over the
course of three days in a remote part of Walikale territory. According to several
sources, Sheka ordered his soldiers to systematically rape women, instead of just
looting and beating people as they usually do, because he wanted to draw atten-
tion to his armed group and to be invited to the negotiating table. He knew that
using sexual violence was the best way to reach this goal, because it would draw the
attention of the international community, and various states and advocacy groups
would put pressure on the Congolese government to negotiate with him—which is
exactly what happened.58
Media coverage of wartime atrocities in Sierra Leone led to a similar outcome, but for ampu-
tations rather than rape. The final report of Sierra Leone’s Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion revealed allegations that the amputations that had characterised the war had been a spe-
cific strategy, by both the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) and the rebel Revolutionary United Front
(RUF). Neither side felt they were getting enough international recognition, and both recog-
58Séverine Autesserre, ‘Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences’,
African Affairs 111:443, April 2012, pp. 217–218.
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nised “how much international coverage the amputations were getting as compared to other
aspects of the war”. The result was “a joint decision [by the SLA and the RUF] in the jungle
around Koinadugu in late 1997/early 1998 that they should conduct amputations”. As a result,
according to one TRC witness, “When we started cutting hands, hardly a day BBC would not
talk about us.”59 With international attention came aid money, and ultimately, a peace-keeping
operation that was the UN’s biggest at the time.
The Commission’s final report comments,
Regardless of whether such a meeting did take place, the notion that the degree of
media coverage of amputations influenced the degree of perpetration of this vio-
lation, especially when factions were loosing [sic] and retaliating, seems to make
sense.. . . This seems to be a deranged way of addressing problems, but for a faction
in decline. . . and members of which are concerned about their own chances of sur-
vival, especially under a new government, it might be a plausible way of thinking.60
In conflicts in poor countries, aid can be a sufficiently attractive incentive for the conflict to
steer towards any type of violence that is likely to attract more aid. For one SLA army veteran,
the logic is clear: “For any war there must be an atrocity for the outside world to know there
is something wrong in the place.”61 In these sorts of situations, aid can act as a form of foreign
direct investment, where atrocities bring renewed international attention and extra resources.
Without atrocities and war, the country would slip back into obscurity, losing the funds upon
which both combatants and the society as a whole have come to rely.
2.3 Unregulated aid and unintended consequences
Aid in war zones can have negative consequences that are not due to specific manipulation by
combatants, but arise because of the way aid is distributed, and the limitations that operating in
a war zone impose on humanitarian agencies. One of the effects that is most difficult to predict
is the effect of aid on the local economy, whether in war or peace-time. The presence of aid
59Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission. 2004, 〈http://www.sierraleonetrc.org/index.php/view-the-final-report〉,




money in a country’s economy can lead to a form of Dutch disease, where large amounts of aid
money coming into a country change the value of important local goods.62 When large amounts
of aid flow into a country and cause a temporary boom in an otherwise depressed economy, it
can happen that “the public sector, recipient of aid, crowds out the private sector through its
increased spending associated with aid.”63
This happens in two important ways: unbalancing food commodity pricing and skewing
employment markets. Handouts of food aid, if not carefully managed, can depress the price of
food, meaning that any farmers still able to produce food and bring it to market may not earn
enough to continue. This can lead to a dependence on imported food aid in subsequent years.
One solution is for humanitarian organisations to purchase food from local sources, where it
exists, but even this can have negative effects, raising the price of food commodities out of
the reach of poor people who are not covered by feeding schemes. Amartya Sen’s work on
famine demonstrates that starvation can occur even when there is adequate food in a coun-
try, due to lack of sufficient money to purchase food among poorer people. Wars can destroy
entire economies, but in many cases, the economy radically shifts, changing the distribution
of wealth. These changes mean that “food prices may shoot up because of the increased pur-
chasing power of some occupational groups [in the case of war, most likely warriors and war
profiteers], and as a result others who have to buy their food may be ruined because the real
purchasing power of their money incomes may have shrunk sharply. Such a famine may occur
without any decline in food output, resulting as it does from a rise in competing demand rather
than fall in total supply.”64
Similarly, aid agencies usually need local staff in order to help them meet their goals. When
paying large salaries to foreign nationals, there is pressure to offer equivalent levels of compen-
sation for local staff. This often means that aid agencies pay extremely well compared to local
companies and government, and can attract the top talent away from local organisations. This
can have severe implications for the success of local industries. Hospitals, for example, may
find their doctors taking well-paid consulting jobs with international organisations, and thus
62See, for example, Polman, op. cit., p. 188.
63Mwanza Nkusu, ‘Aid and the Dutch Disease in Low-Income Countries’, International Monetary Fund Working
Paper 04/49, March 2004, p. 7.
64Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 167.
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lack the staff to adequately respond to local emergencies.
The creation of refugee camps and nutrition centres can also have a significant effect on
local economies. Concentrating people in a particular area is an efficient means of distributing
food aid, but it can also expose people who may already be in fragile health due to malnutri-
tion, wartime injury or illness, to fast-moving diseases like cholera. As Amartya Sen points out,
moving people off their land shifts labour away from jobs like farming and lowers productiv-
ity.65 Farmers and farm labourers moving off their land are likely to have a significant impact
on food availability in subsequent years. This is perhaps less problematic for aid in the case
of war, where farmers might move off their land due to fear of violence rather than because of
abundant food in camps, but when the problem is lack of food, concentrating people in feed-
ing camps is likely to compound the problem, sometimes as part of an intentional strategy, as
in the case of the 1984 Ethiopian famine, discussed above.
Aid provision, because it is often not subject to regulations in regions that may lack effec-
tive governance, can also cause a number of problems from destructive competition between
aid agencies to unlicensed surgery. Since war zones typically lack effective governance struc-
tures, and aid groups are not required to register with any central humanitarian body, they often
operate without oversight. For large NGOs with many donors and a prominent brand to pro-
tect, donor and media scrutiny may be sufficient to reduce bad behaviour to competition with
other large aid agencies for media attention, but for smaller organisations, raising their fund-
ing from smaller communities, can often act as they see fit, without having to account for their
actions. In the worst cases, this can result in multiple, contradictory medical consultations, or
reckless surgery performed by unqualified doctors. According to Linda Polman, “One [NGO]
that wandered through a refugee camp in Liberia in 2004 consisted of a group of American
medical students, who carried out procedures they weren’t licensed to perform in the United
States.”66 Another small group in Sierra Leone justified risky surgery on a new-born baby by ar-
guing, “Nobody’s going to help this child unless we do something. . . .” As Polman points out, at
the time, they ignored the fact that many other NGOs with extensive medical experience, such
as Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross, were working in
65ibid., p. 177.
66Polman, op. cit., p. 58.
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Sierra Leone. Poor medical judgement, insufficient surgical preparation, and the lack of follow-
up care from these small NGOs meant that patients who had received surgery could experience
significant complications, which required further intervention from larger NGOs.
At their worst, unregulated aid organisations, whether from a misguided desire to help,
or a cynical desire to make money off war victims, are alleged to have engaged in behaviour
such as child trafficking. In 2007, the UN news agency IRIN reported Vivian Cherue, a Liberian
government official, as saying “Most of the children living in almost all of the orphanages in
this country are not actual orphans, but have been used by orphanage owners to seek external
funding for their personal gains.” According to the article, the owners of orphanages “block
efforts to re-integrate children into their families and even snatch children.”67
It can be difficult for donors to ensure that the money they contribute goes to organisations
that are providing useful services, and not to organisations that are set up to exploit lucrative
donations for personal benefit. Security problems that aid agencies encounter in war zones
can hinder effective reporting, and ruin efforts to ensure that aid reaches the people who need
it most. When NGO staff are at risk, it is logical for an organization to prohibit field visits, with-
out which it can be hard to determine where aid goes, how it is distributed, and the true needs
of the communities to whom aid is sent. In Afghanistan, the vulnerability of aid agencies to at-
tack has meant that projects are subcontracted, and often monitored only by photographs and
receipts. Polman quotes one Afghan accountant, working for USAID: “Sometimes I’m shown a
hundred and fifty receipts with the same signature.. . . I sometimes see pictures of exactly the
same project with different donors. Aid groups are happy to be financed three times over. After
all, the donors don’t come and look.”68 Because monitoring is most difficult in areas controlled
by the Taliban, according to Polman, aid in these areas is most vulnerable to being siphoned off
by fighters, to strengthen their support or to further their combat goals.
In war zones, there can also be tension between ending a conflict and offering relief, in
part because of the difficulty of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. A well-known
example occurred in 1993 in Liberia, when Ecomog, the peace-keeping force of the Economic
67IRIN News, ‘Fake orphans to attract donor funds’, IRIN Africa, 17 May 2007, 〈http://www.irinnews.org/
Report/72222/LIBERIA-Fake-orphans-to-attract-donor-funds〉.
68Polman, op. cit., p. 148.
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Community of West African States (Ecowas), restricted aid supplies to a narrow corridor through
the port of Buchanan, in an effort to suppress suspected arms smuggling through relief supplies
from Côte d’Ivoire. This embargo was causing malnutrition in areas inaccessible from the cor-
ridor, and Médecins Sans Frontières continued delivering aid, despite the embargo. Ecomog
responded by bombing an MSF convoy. After the incident, the UN’s special representative to
Liberia, supporting Ecomog, was reported to have commented, “Certain organizations have the
task of bringing relief to those in need. We have a more important task: bringing peace. If relief
gets in the way of peacemaking then there will be no relief.”69
2.4 Prolonging conflict
Given these conditions, some commentators have worried that aid and humanitarian inter-
vention can end up prolonging conflict, with attempts at alleviating suffering resulting in more
deaths. In Ethiopia between 1982 and 1988, Alex de Waal concludes, “There is no doubt that
[the] relief programme supported President Mengistu militarily and politically. In Tigray, very
few people and very many soldiers were fed by the relief. The humanitarian effort prolonged
the war, and with it, human suffering.”70
Ian Smillie came to a similar conclusion about the provision of aid to Biafra in 1968, in that
polity’s struggle to secede from Nigeria. Aid was airlifted into Biafra, in response to widespread
fears of a Nigerian genocide against Biafrans were the secessionist movement to collapse. Smil-
lie describes the relief effort as “an act of unfortunate and profound folly. . . . A great deal of
post-war effort went into refuting the charge that the churches and NGOs prolonged the war.
Because if it is true, they must have also prolonged the suffering, contributing to the deaths of
180 000 people or more.”71
The aid that is given today often aims to supply what was initially thought to be lacking in
under-developed countries in the immediate post-colonial period: money. Under-developed
countries lacked the financial resources to invest in infrastructure or skills training, and the
69Quoted in Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2002, p. 24.
70Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2009, p. 127.
71Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire. London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995, p. 104.
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obvious solution was to make up for the short-fall, giving developing countries the money nec-
essary to build that infrastructure. But in recent years, the “missing money” hypothesis has
been modified, after the realisation that the money given to under-developed countries has
not substantially reduced levels of poverty in those countries, and that many countries, after
all the aid has been sent, are actually poorer. “After decades of trying to understand the prob-
lems of development, it is now widely accepted that the core problem is ‘missing institutions’
or ‘perverse institutions’ instead of ‘missing money’.”72 The problem that war zones present to
well-intentioned humanitarians is that wars tend to destroy institutions that don’t advance the
cause of the war. As a result, giving money can appear to be a more suitable solution than at-
tempting to build fragile institutions, which in any case are unlikely to survive the end of the
war.
Not all aid falls into these traps. A successful project, with well-informed and motivated
aid workers, may be able to negotiate with soldiers to create a safe space for affected civilians.
However, this is not always possible. If we do have a duty to help people who have been affected
by conflict, then we most certainly have a duty to avoid worsening the conflict. The presence of
such a duty compels us to look for solutions that alleviate the problems that aid can introduce,
or to help by reducing the likelihood that conflict will arise in contested situations. Humanitar-
ian aid, as it is practised, may be a legitimate part of a response to the suffering in war, but it
cannot be the only response.
72Gibson et al., op. cit., p. 14.
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3 Potential Solutions
The objection to a duty to give assistance to people whose lives are threatened by conflict, that
aid can worsen, or fail to improve the position of people so affected, is not easily dismissed.
If we wish to address the objection, we must analyse other strategies that can help victims of
violent conflict, to see if any of these offer more relief, whether it be withdrawing support given
to these victims in order better to assist others (and avoiding hurting those we intend to help);
attempting to resolve the conflict without causing more misery; or changing the way the inter-
national system deals with conflict-affected areas.
3.1 Moving aid elsewhere
One immediate potential solution to the problem presents itself: that of reducing material sup-
port. Having seen the types of problems that can occur when external money enters a conflict,
one might conclude that withholding this money might resolve the problems, or produce an
early conclusion to the war. Instead of giving aid to people who desperately need it, whose
lives have been ruined by war, we might instead reserve the money for situations where it can
make the biggest difference, even if the victims’ plight is not as desperate. As Thomas Pogge ar-
gues, “It is often foreseeable that candidate INGO projects would cause harm to innocent peo-
ple. It may be foreseeable, for example, that warring factions will rob some of the resources we
might dispatch into some volatile region and will then use them to inflict further violence.. . . In
such cases, ordinary cost-effectiveness reasons against choosing this project. . . are enhanced
by negative moral reasons not to add to the (risk of) harm suffered by such potential victims.”73
Pogge argues that it makes sense to concentrate aid in a few desperately poor countries
with a proven record of using it effectively, rather than to distribute it widely and have the effect
of the aid diluted by poor policies or risky political environments.74 Focussing on the effective-
ness of aid, rather than on the situation of the people it aims to help, can improve aid outcomes.
Providing aid to good governments, for example, creates incentives towards good governance.
Similarly, steering aid towards the poorest countries first ensures that aid projects, using locally-
73Pogge, ‘Moral Priorities for International Human Rights NGOs’, op. cit., p. 251.
74ibid., p. 231.
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sourced resources, are cheaper to implement; if it is cheaper to help people, the aid will spread
further and make an impact on more peoples’ lives.
However, the strategy of withholding aid is problematic for a number of reasons. Improv-
ing the social outcomes for the poor in underdeveloped countries that are not at war may help
to prevent war in future, but that delivers no benefit to people whose lives and livelihoods are
threatened now. Indeed, if donors followed this strategy, the existence of a war, and the in-
stability it generates, would prevent victims receiving outside help, whether humanitarian aid,
development assistance, or financial investment. Humanitarian aid may worsen or help pro-
long conflict, but the promise of aid at the end of a war can also provide an incentive for warring
parties to forge a peace, even though donors who give aid do not know whether the institutions
that may emerge after the peace will be effective, or govern well.
There is a further problem: even withholding aid can benefit aggressors in a conflict. As
Mary Anderson writes, “When international assistance is given in the context of a violent con-
flict, it becomes part of that context and thus also of the conflict.”75 Abstaining from helping
is not a neutral act either. Just as giving financial assistance to a rebel faction fighting a bad
government signals that donors approve of the rebels and provides a measure of legitimacy,
to withhold aid from that faction can support the status quo, even if no financial assistance is
given to the government: “Decisions to remain on the sidelines can be considered a form of
intervention in that by failing to help the oppressed, humanitarians comply with the oppres-
sors.”76
Humanitarians might respond by emphasising that their aid is intended neither for the un-
just government, nor for the rebels (who, after all, may be no better when in government), but
for the civilians caught up in a war not of their own making. But this logic assumes that victims
have no political allegiances to particular factions, and that partisans cannot be victims. In So-
malia, David Rieff asks whether humanitarian aid, attempting to weaken support for Mohamed
Farrah Aidid, a Somali leader whose attempted capture by U.S. military forces led to the Black
Hawk Down incident, had that effect: “Was it really safe to assume that none of these starving
75Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—Or War. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1999, p. 1.
76Amir Pasic and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘The Politics of Rescue: Yugoslavia’s Wars and the Humanitarian Impulse’,
Ethics and International Affairs 11:1, 1997, p. 113.
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people had any politics, or that it was impossible to be, simultaneously, an Aidid supporter and
a victim of the famine in Somalia?”77 Giving aid, even to famine victims, may have the effect of
supporting the leaders who provoked the crisis. In Rwanda, the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween Hutu fighters and civilians fleeing led to charges that humanitarians had unintentionally
protected the very people that were responsible for the genocide.
It may be necessary to remove aid from conflict situations where the aid is not having pos-
itive effects, but few humanitarians will be satisfied with this strategy as a solution to the plight
of victims of war. Of course, aid may not be as essential to the victims of war as those who give
the money believe it to be. Fiona Terry writes about the aid community’s “ingrained belief that
humanitarian action is indispensable to the survival of refugees and other victims of disasters.
Although studies of local coping mechanisms [that have developed to relieve starvation in the
case of famine] may contradict this assumption. . . it remains the axiomatic starting point for
humanitarian action”.78
However, even if a decision to withhold aid is justified by the negative effects of the aid,
staying clear of the conflict may have its own negative effects. Withholding aid may strengthen
the position of a corrupt government, and lack of intervention may enable them to carry out
ghastly actions. The scale of humanitarian action in Rwanda was due in part to the realisa-
tion that the international community had done nothing to prevent the slaughter of over half
a million people. In Bosnia, according to David Rieff, humanitarians concentrated on feed-
ing people, rather than stopping the war: “Stop the war. . . and there will be no humanitarian
emergency. Let the war continue, and you will just be creating well-fed corpses.”79 This suggests
another approach that might better assist victims of war.
3.2 Taking sides to resolve conflict
Rieff’s point about stopping the war is well-taken: the best approach may be to focus on po-
litical solutions to the problem of war. A well-known remark from Sadako Ogata, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees from 1991 to 2001, says, “There are no humanitarian solutions to
77David Rieff, A Bed For the Night: Humanitarianism In Crisis. London: Vintage, 2002, p. 36 (emphasis original).
78Terry, op. cit., p. 233.
79Rieff, op. cit., p. 144.
33
humanitarian problems.”80 Or, as Fiona Terry puts it, “A full belly does not provide civilians with
protection. What is the point of securing humanitarian access to people if it deters us from rec-
ognizing that they are in danger of losing their lives to violence?”81 One obvious solution to the
problem would be to try and end wars as quickly as possible, either by having a strong outside
party—whether a powerful state like France or the United States, or a coalition endorsed by the
United Nations Security Council—picking a winner, and supporting them in winning their war
and forming a government; or by enforcing a peace, in effect the kind of military intervention
practised in Kosovo in 1999, or in Libya in 2011.
Paul Collier puts forward a compelling version of this argument, in the form of a guaran-
tee offered to democratically-elected governments by militarily powerful governments, offering
military support in suppressing coup attempts. Collier’s argument is that wars are extraordinar-
ily expensive for a society, even when they are against bad governments. Coups offer a better
chance of removing a bad government without incurring the massive social disruptions of war,
although one coup attempt tends to incite further coup attempts, even against a new and bet-
ter government, which can lead to war. Governments that have been elected in free and fair
elections would be offered a guarantee of military support in the case of a coup, which would
operate as a deterrent against coups. Governments that steal elections would get no guarantee,
creating an incentive for opponents to engineer a coup and unseat the illegitimate government.
To prevent the coup escalating into conflict, a government formed after a successful coup would
receive the same guarantee, conditional on elections being held at some pre-determined future
point. At the point at which such a government is regarded as having reneged on its commit-
ment to hold elections, the guarantee would be withdrawn, putting them at risk of another
coup.82 Such a scheme does not remove the prospect of a democratic government being over-
thrown by a coup, nor does it ensure that coups result in good governance, but it could reduce
the bad effects of some coups, without making legitimate governments less stable.
There is an extensive literature on humanitarian military intervention, or military inter-
80See, for example, Vivian Tan, ‘Ogata calls for stronger political will to solve
refugee crises’, Reliefweb, 27 May 2005, 〈http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/
ogata-calls-stronger-political-will-solve-refugee-crises〉.
81Terry, op. cit., p. 234.
82Collier, op. cit., pp. 205–207.
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vention aimed at safeguarding civilians and ending conflict. Engaging in detail with this topic
is beyond the scope of this project. However, there are reasons to argue that military interven-
tion to help civilians dying in conflict situations should not be a duty that we owe to civilians
affected by conflict.
Most interventions do not aim to end coup attempts and restore stability to legitimate ex-
isting governments, but to end protracted wars in countries that have political significance
for the intervening powers, often fought by multiple belligerents who may have all commit-
ted atrocities. In some cases, military intervention can be a useful tool for halting a low-level
conflict, enforcing a peace between combatants, or removing groups whose financial backing
outweighs their popular support and who lack credible post-conflict goals. However, leaving
aside issues such as the difficulty of encouraging powerful nations to intervene, taking sides
may mean choosing between two (or more) groups who may share appalling human rights
records, making all options unpalatable to anyone concerned with the welfare of poor citizens.
Outsiders’ knowledge of a struggle can be coloured by cultural misunderstandings and faulty
intelligence; information in wartime is notoriously unreliable. The choice of an outside judge
in such a dispute may not accord with the will of the local people, and imposes a certain re-
sponsibility for the outcome upon the judge.
If the international community were to impose a settlement or force a peace through mil-
itary means, a host of additional problems may present themselves, from compliance issues to
the difficulty of acting (and being seen to act) as an external, neutral policing force in the midst
of a hard-fought war. Resolving local social problems that led to the conflict can also prove to be
a difficult enterprise. Such problems can take many years to resolve, and the risk of a relapse is
such that continuing intervention may be necessary for many years after the end of the conflict.
Perhaps the most convincing reason not to support such a solution in pursuing our duty
to the poor is that humanitarians may have legitimate ethical objections to war. David Rieff
relates the dilemma that faced humanitarians in Somalia. Faced with widespread looting of
humanitarian convoys and violent action against aid workers, humanitarians began to employ
armed guards to protect the aid: “From the intervention in Somalia forward, humanitarians
all but insisted that the soldiers guarding them had to shoot the looters so they could get the
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supplies through to the beneficiaries. Whereas taking lives in order to save lives had once been
anathema to relief workers, it was increasingly understood as something that might be neces-
sary, at least in the most extreme situations.”83 From there, it was a short step to full military
intervention. According to Michael Maren, “Somalia is not a story of how a humanitarian mis-
sion became a military mission. It’s about how the people running a humanitarian mission
became so dedicated to their cause that they started to see strafing, bombing, and killing as
humanitarian acts.”84
Military intervention, acting as a humanitarian tool to reduce suffering, is extremely prob-
lematic. For some, military intervention is the only sure way to protect innocents in a war. For
others, becoming implicated in the violence that they are trying to stop is a betrayal of human-
itarian goals. The value of intervention is not simply a matter of balancing “lives saved” against
“lives taken” by intervention forces. An intervening power may well start to reconsider its ob-
jectives when its soldiers or peace-keepers die, either withdrawing from the conflict or altering
military strategy. Civilian casualties—so-called “collateral damage”—as well as the denial of
non-combatants’ basic human rights, are an inevitable risk of any military operation, and such
casualties can rise even higher when intervention forces act to protect their soldiers through
the use of drone strikes, anti-terror measures and high-altitude bombing campaigns. Just as
donating humanitarian aid can make the plight of civilians in conflict situations worse, military
intervention can cause harm to civilians that calls into question any positive political effects. As
Rieff comments, “a humanitarianism that supports the idea of war carried out in its name is un-
worthy of that name. . . . Humanitarian war should be seen as a contradiction in terms, not an
increasingly sought-after ‘solution’ to the ills of the world.”85 Labelling a war as “humanitarian”
can suppress criticism and dissent, regardless of the real goals of intervention forces, and we
should be sceptical of interventions that are so named, to ensure that the actions of intervening
forces are consistent with the stated goals of such interventions. Military intervention can be
a useful means of ending a conflict, but the destructive force of war means that if our goal is
to prevent suffering and death, it is difficult to justify engaging in war in order to discharge our
83Rieff, op. cit., pp. 258–259.
84Maren, op. cit., pp. 217–218.
85Rieff, op. cit., p. 258.
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duty to assist victims of war.
3.3 Sanctions
One strategy that may have some effect against dictators and rebels is to apply sanctions against
their governments, restricting the goods and services that they can buy or sell on the interna-
tional market, or diplomatic relations between countries. When broadly implemented by a
number of prominent countries (for example, under UN Security Council sanctions), this can
limit the ability of leaders to wage war, starving them of resources.
There is much disagreement about the effectiveness and utility of sanctions, whether ap-
plied generally, or in specific situations. Governments against whom sanctions have been ap-
plied may have great trouble keeping their economy afloat; however, if the government does
not rule by common consent, and does not suffer when its reputation and, as a result, its public
authority, is diminished, sanctions may prove ineffective. Sanctions may harm the population
more than the rulers against whom the sanctions are effected: bad rulers, because they are few
in number, are able to acquire sufficient wealth to insulate themselves from the effects of some
types of sanctions, even as their population suffers from the limited availability of imported
goods and export markets.
Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances, sanctions may prove an effective tool in lim-
iting the ability of a bad government or rebel force to wage war. A ban on arms imports into
a country at war, for example, may curb a bad government’s ability to prosecute a war. More-
over, if civilians are at risk because of the dangers of war, the additional harm posed to them
by sanctions may not be substantial, relative to the impaired effectiveness of the war effort, or
may be less severe than the bad effects if aid to civilians is redirected to support the war effort
or manipulated to help achieve measures that hurt civilians such as forced resettlement.
Sanctions are most likely to be effective when targeting combatants in precise ways, ac-
cording to the specific situation. Because sanctions need to be tailored, and are of limited use
outside of discussions of government policy, they would not be a tactic well-suited to resolving
a general duty to assist people caught in war.
If political solutions such as military intervention and sanctions are unpredictable, and
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removing aid raises as many questions as giving aid, we might instead consider a broader class
of action, which aims not to affect one particular situation, but to alter the situation of people
affected by conflict more generally, by looking at features of the international system that spread
poverty, and encourage conflict. Governments wishing to halt a conflict should consider the
potential positive effects of various types of sanctions, but there exists a more direct, and more
general, route to limiting the fund-raising capabilities of combatants.
3.4 Removing trade rules that hurt the poor
One of Thomas Pogge’s suggestions to combat poverty is to remove WTO treaty rules permitting
the use of domestic tariffs, quotas and anti-dumping duties, which bar poor countries from
fully participating in international markets, limiting economic opportunities and preventing
the poor from improving their situation. One set of WTO-approved policies that hurt the poor
are agricultural subsidies in rich nations such as the United States and the European Union.
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy provides direct subsidies to farmers and farm-owning
corporations which amount to around €40 billion a year;86 in the U.S., government subsidies to
agriculture total about $18 billion a year.87 Removing these, many argue, would promote access
to world markets by poor countries.
Subsidies of this sort are controversial, both locally and internationally. Within the U.S.
and the EU, a substantial portion of the subsidies are directed to large corporations that own
huge farms, rather than the small-scale farmers that the subsidies were originally designed to
help. Internationally, the subsidies allow large American and European farms to sell produce
at rates that producers in smaller, poorer countries cannot match, and to run excesses which
are dumped in foreign countries as a form of aid. In poorer countries, it may be cheaper to
import American and European food than to buy from local farmers, which drives local farmers
out of business and disrupts food security and job markets. Moreover, farmers who are able
to compete locally may have trouble competing internationally, limiting the market for their
86Stephen Castle and Doreen Carvajal, ‘Europe’s Vast Farm Subsidies Face Challenges’, New York Times, 29 Decem-
ber 2009, 〈http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/business/global/30subsidy.html〉.
87William Neuman, ‘Farmers Facing Loss of Subsidy May Get New One’, New




Removing or minimising these subsidies could help poorer countries to participate in the
international market, generating greater profits and productivity, as well as lowering taxes for
the residents of richer nations.
Improvements that reform international institutions and remove the rules that lead to high
mortality rates among poorer people and violate human rights might not be sufficient to ad-
dress the problem of extreme poverty in many cases, and it is unlikely that removing the sub-
sidies will do much to benefit people during conflict, when they are most vulnerable. Even if
reform is successful, the positive effects that reform achieves may not reach the poor if they live
with social structures that hurt economic growth, or under a bad government whose policies
are worse for the poor than the harmful international rules, or their country has geographical
features that limit access to international markets.
Greater access to international markets can help a country that is recovering from a war,
creating a more stable peace. Strong international ties can also raise the cost of war, making
it less likely to occur. Removing agricultural subsidies and other market restrictions, and re-
forming trade rules that hurt poor nations may, as Pogge suggests, be a substantial part of our
duty to help the poor. But it is unlikely that people living in countries with bad governments, or
in countries at war, will benefit directly because, as Singer points out, the government may be
“following ill-advised economic policies or because politics, customs, and social structures are
so inimical to economic productivity that few are willing to invest”.88
In this case, Singer argues, “aid aimed at improving local food production and providing
education and basic health care may be the best, indeed the only, way of helping the nation’s
poor.”89 Because there are clearly identifiable reasons—conflict, and the behaviour of local
aggressors—for the plight of victims of war, it may appear to be the case that alleviating the
worst deprivations, or forcing a halt to the conflict, offers the best hope of improving their sit-
uation. However, these clear reasons can hide less obvious, but equally influential factors such
as the incentives that provoke leaders to resolve problems through warfare. These incentives
can arise from the international rules that have the effect of allowing bad governments and lo-
88Singer, The Life You Can Save, op. cit., p. 114.
89ibid.
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cal warlords to raise money and consolidate control by manipulating resources and areas of
influence.
3.5 Borrowing and resource privileges
Pogge suggests a number of ways in which the international order is set up that encourage
conflict, particularly in resource-rich but otherwise poor countries, in the form of privileges
that are extended by the international community to any group “controlling a preponderance of
the means of coercion within a country”, which is “internationally recognized as the legitimate
government of the country’s territory and people—regardless of how this group came to power,
of how it exercises power, and of how much popular support it has.”90
This recognition allows the government of a country to sell that country’s resources, re-
gardless of how the money is distributed or spent (the resource privilege); to borrow money
from international institutions, which may require legitimate future governments to repay the
debt (the borrowing privilege); and to buy arms and equip state organs such as the military or
police force, which may be used against the population (the arms privilege).91
The resource privilege allows rulers to sell their country’s natural resources. In countries
with legitimate governments, this is uncontroversial, equivalent to the owner of goods selling
them. However, in cases where the government is illegitimate, having come to power through a
coup or stolen elections, this arrangement can be problematic: the money is likely to be spent
not on the population of that country, but on advancing the aims or personal wealth of the
rulers, or to buy support. Pogge gives the example of a group of criminals overpowering the
guards at a warehouse. In the ordinary case, someone who buys the loot may possess that
loot, but is not legally recognised as its owner. But an individual or organisation buying re-
sources from a group that has seized power in a country is legally recognised as the owner of
the goods, with all the rights and liberties that come with ownership.92 Just as stolen property
does not rightfully belong to subsequent buyers, resources that are bought from illegitimate
90Thomas Pogge, ‘The Role of International Law in Reproducing Massive Poverty’, in Samantha Besson and John
Tasioulas, editors, The Philosophy of International Law. New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2010, p. 428.
91It also allows governments to sign international treaties, potentially placing constraints on the population of a
country, even under future governments; however, I will not concentrate on the detail of this or the arms privilege.
92ibid., pp. 428–429.
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governments should remain the property of the people of that country.
The resource privilege may provide an incentive for people with sufficient political or mili-
tary backing to launch a coup or civil war, in order to grab control of the sale of resources; it also
gives outside groups incentives to offer them support, in exchange for preferential access to the
resources, or to bribe officials in exchange for cheaper resources.93 Although there is some dis-
agreement about statistical evidence for the former, it is generally agreed that, even if resources
do not make war more likely, the looting of resources does appear to extend the duration of
conflicts by subsidising the fighting, in some cases becoming so profitable so as to weaken any
incentive to sue for peace.94
Resources on their own can increase the risk of conflict, providing “a ready source of fi-
nance for rebel groups, . . . a honey pot to fight over, and. . . [enabling] the government to func-
tion without taxing the incomes of citizens, which gradually detaches it from what the citizens
want.”95 The resource privilege is a mechanism that encourages conflict in these situations. In
Liberia, for example, Charles Taylor sold vast quantities of Liberia’s lumber and diamonds (as
well as diamonds from eastern Sierra Leone), in order to finance his military adventures. He
launched a civil war against the government of Samuel Doe in 1989, with backing from Libya’s
Muammar Gaddafi, and eventually became president of the country from 1997 until 2003.
A related problem applies to the borrowing privilege, which allows a government to impose
obligations against future governments of the same territory, which those future rulers must re-
pay in order to themselves borrow money: “A later government that refuses to honour debts
incurred by a corrupt, brutal, undemocratic, unconstitutional, repressive, unpopular predeces-
sor will be severely punished by the banks and governments of other countries. At a minimum,
it will lose its own borrowing privilege by being excluded from the international financial mar-
kets.”96 As with the resource privilege, this can offer an incentive to coup leaders: if the coup
is successful, they are able to borrow money with which to finance their goals; repayment is a
problem for the future, and for the country as a whole, even if the money they borrowed ad-
93ibid., p. 429.
94Michael L. Ross, ‘What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?’, Journal of Peace Research 41:3, May
2004, pp. 341–346.
95Collier, op. cit., p. 126.
96Pogge, ‘The Role of International Law’, op. cit., p. 429.
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vanced their personal goals, or personal wealth.
There is another, even more worrying consequence of this: when a war-torn or coup-riven
country does achieve stability, the new democratic rulers are still obliged to repay the debts
incurred by their warlord predecessors, money which is unlikely to have been spent on use-
ful infrastructure. As a result, the democratic government’s ability to invest in nation-building
projects is limited, and the government becomes more likely to fail: less successful and there-
fore less stable.
Limiting the options open to governments that are not accountable to their people, or im-
posing conditions on the use of money raised through resource and borrowing privileges could
remove the incentive for, or moderate the ability of, rebel movements to stage coups or wage
war. Collier estimates that the economic cost of a typical civil war in a poor country is around
$20 billion, “the equivalent of losing two years of income.”97 As he comments, “Unless the rebels
are unquestionably a whole lot better than the government, then the cost inflicted for the one-
in-five chance that the rebellion will lead to the government being overthrown is far too high,
and the rebellion should be discouraged.”98,99
In some respects, limiting resource and borrowing privileges may appear to have the same
effect as sanctions: both attempt to limit the funding available to bad governments. However,
aside from the obvious differences in cause, there are also a number of important differences
in scope. Where sanctions are applied on a case-by-case basis, applying leverage against par-
ticular areas likely to most affect a bad government, restricting these privileges requires a small
number of changes that affect a broad variety of different situations. Sports sanctions, for ex-
ample, are unlikely to have an effect in most war-torn countries; restricting travel and freezing
the assets of bad rulers may have a good effect in many situations, but will be relatively useless
against warlords who don’t travel or haven’t access to foreign capital. Given the cost of waging
war, restricting the ability of bad leaders and warlords to sell resources or borrow money may
have a significant effect on their ability to fight.
I have not discussed the arms privilege in detail, in part because it is self-evident that allow-
97Collier, op. cit., p. 137.
98Collier excludes coups from this judgement, as he believes that they can lead to better outcomes than outright
war; his analysis suggests a coup costs a country only around seven percent of a year’s income.
99ibid., pp. 143–144.
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ing bad governments to purchase armaments might worsen the situation of civilians in those
countries. In addition, because the potential harm is so obvious, this problem can be addressed
by sanctions in a reasonable manner. However, a blanket rule prohibiting arms transfers to
countries (and rebel groups) that are engaged in civil war, or that fail to demonstrate that they
legitimately represent their people, might be preferable to case-by-case sanctions. A more am-
bitious scheme might tie arms sales to engagement in peace talks or adherence to a cease-fire;
to aid facilitation that prevents fighting groups from taking advantage of humanitarian aid to
feed soldiers, generate revenue, or manipulate enemies or civilians; or to inspections, following
the model of nuclear non-proliferation inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
that evaluate the extent to which fighters target civilians. Such schemes would have to be care-
fully managed, as they could conceivably have negative effects, and the idea of tying arms sales
to peace talks in particular could lead to bad outcomes if not controlled to ensure that the arms
are used to police a cease-fire, rather than having participants attend peace talks in disingenu-
ous fashion, simply to receive arms.
There are a number of reasons that the borrowing and resource privileges remain features
of the international system. Chief amongst them is they both arise from the Westphalian no-
tion of the nation-state, with its emphasis on the inviolate sovereignty of individual states. In
principle, for other states to make decisions about the legitimacy of other governments could
invite questions about their own legitimacy.
This need not cause problems for reformers who wish to restrict these privileges, largely
because of the increasing belief that foreigners, and foreign states, may have a responsibility
to help the poor and disenfranchised. Development aid, for example, is increasingly breaking
down traditional guarantees of sovereignty; and the increase in military intervention in con-
flicts over the past decade, based on Kofi Annan’s doctrine that foreign states have a duty to
protect civilians in situations of war, has further limited any expectation of sovereign privileges
in war.
Both of these processes can be problematic. In the past, military interventions that have
been justified in terms of the suffering of civilians have sometimes yielded greater political ad-
vantages for the intervention force than protection for civilians; development aid can similarly
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be politicised. These concerns, however, are not intractable. They suggest that the process of
restricting the privileges available to illegitimate governments can be swayed, based on that
government’s political connections and overall role in broader regional developments. How-
ever, this is not fundamentally different from the present situation, where powerful nations may
withhold recognition of new governments for political ends, or where decisions about military
intervention may be influenced by a range of factors other than the legitimacy of the govern-
ment in question.
A second concern, related to that about sovereignty, is about the threshold at which a gov-
ernment is judged sufficiently legitimate to merit privileges such as that of borrowing money
and selling resources to raise funds. Restricting these privileges to democratically-elected gov-
ernments might raise problems for governments that are generally held to be legitimate and
answerable to their citizens. A reasonable compromise might be to require that, for organisa-
tions engaging in trade with, or lending money to governments embroiled in wars (or for those
organisations’ own governments), rather than certify the legitimacy of the government, they be
required to ensure that the profits or loaned resources are spent for the benefit of the people of
the country, rather than on the political ends of the rulers of that country, such as arms acqui-
sitions, or patronage. It may be the case that the rulers use borrowed money to finance health
projects, and withdraw the money they would have otherwise spent on those health projects to
spend on insalubrious projects instead. Such loans should be withheld from governments that
are illegitimate, or should be restricted to governments that can demonstrate that the loans will
not lead to any increases in military or intelligence budgets, and will be used for the benefit
of ordinary citizens, such as through infrastructure improvement. Such demonstrations might
be accomplished by separating the loans into stages; before a new stage can be approved, ear-
lier stages must pass financial checks. It should be possible to monitor changes in government
spending—and military spending in particular, by tracking arms purchases and deliveries and
increases in military equipment or force size—to restrict these types of abuse. Or borrowing
governments may be required to consent to inspections or oversight to ensure that the loans
are used for the good of all citizens, rather than to further the aims of politically powerful mem-
bers of government. Such requirements, rather than weakening sovereignty, can have the effect
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of strengthening of sovereignty in the sense of the state acting in the best interests of its citizens,
rather than simply indicating control of the territory.
There are also practical issues such as the difficulty of enforcement and the possible effects
on trade. The restriction of these privileges would be contingent on global adherence to the re-
strictions; if only a few states respected the restrictions, they would have little power. Trade
in particular could present enforcement difficulties: if the government of a large state with ex-
tensive trade relations, offering substantial price concessions in exchange for support, were
judged to be abusing their resource privilege after a coup, in order to wage war against the re-
mains of a legitimate government, there may be substantial political pressure to overlook their
illegitimacy. Some states have large reserves of resources that are essential for manufacturing
particular goods, and restricting trade with their governments could create global shortages. In
practice, though, all collective acts in the international arena are vulnerable to these problems;
the existence of these problems does not, in itself, offer a sufficient counter-argument.
The strategies of reforming resource and borrowing privileges are not vulnerable to the
same criticism of the removal of market restrictions, or of moving aid resources to other com-
munities, that they do nothing to improve the situation of people in wartime. Conflict areas are
especially unlikely to have good governments, or to be in a position to take advantage of im-
proved trade rules and opportunities for economic growth. This shortcoming is less applicable
to reforms of international rules like the borrowing and resource privileges, which aim to make
conflict less likely, rather than to provide economic opportunity to desperately poor people.
Reform of these privileges also offers a solution that is more generally applicable than sanc-
tions, which have to be adjusted for each conflict situation to fit the specific dynamics of that
situation. This is not to say that applying sanctions to a conflict cannot have a useful effect on
the conflict; however, when creating a response to conflict that can be reasonably regarded as
a discharging general duty, applied to a wide range of conflict situations, and communicated
to large groups of people, motivating for a targeted solution such as sanctions is better left to
policy groups and governments. Military intervention suffers from similar problems, while its
potential for destruction and harm suggest that we should first seek other strategies to assist
victims of conflict. To the extent that we wish to help people in the midst of a war, rather than
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during post-conflict reconstruction, strategies such as reforming resource and borrowing priv-
ileges should take a higher priority than market reforms, military intervention, removing or
moving aid, or sanctions.
3.6 The difficulty of reform
Singer raises a second objection, which relates to reform itself, rather than the type of reform.
For Singer, the political difficulty of achieving reform means that campaigning for change is
less effective in combating poverty than charitable contributions. He is willing to concede that
institutional reform may better address the problem of poverty, but believes that agitating for
reform is less helpful than donating money, because there are “powerful political interests al-
lied against the elimination of trade barriers [which] makes political change unlikely.”100 He ac-
knowledges that the objection depends on a number of factors: “whether our money and time
would make a success of such a campaign more likely, how great the gain for the poor if such
a campaign succeeded, and how much good our donation could do if given for other forms of
aid.”101 Singer describes the battle over the United States’ 2008 Farm Bill, which provided agri-
cultural subsidies to farmers. The bill was opposed by “virtually every economist in the country
other than those working for the farm lobby” and was vetoed by then-president George W. Bush.
Despite the opposition, the U.S. Congress raised the required two-thirds majority to overturn
the veto. Singer concludes, “Defeats like this suggest that our efforts are better spent elsewhere,
where we can be confident of making a difference.”102
Leaving aside the issue of whether we can be confident that donations will make a differ-
ence, Singer’s verdict, that the powerful political interests allied against change make reform
less effective than donations, is questionable. While there are well-organised domestic and in-
ternational lobbies that support existing trade policies, and have a vested interest in the exist-
ing configuration of the international system, concerted advocacy can be effective in achieving
meaningful change. The urgency and priority of the problem of poverty in general, and of peo-
ple affected by conflict specifically, is such that, if Singer is correct about the nature of our duty,




the campaign to help afflicted people should be as important as efforts like the women’s suf-
frage movements, the U.S. civil rights movement, and the anti-apartheid struggle, all of which
inspired widespread action to overcome established interests.
Political interests holding out against change are vulnerable to bad publicity and public
pressure, and if it’s possible to encourage more people to advocate for change and raise aware-
ness of the problem than currently donate time or money to anti-poverty efforts and humani-
tarian relief, it may prove easier than Singer believes to shame lobbies into accepting reforms.
Singer’s argument also addresses trade policies like agricultural subsidies, which are espe-
cially intractable issues. By comparison, the resource and borrowing privileges are more diffi-
cult to defend. Proponents of subsidies can attract a good deal of support by using arguments
about food security and domestic competitiveness. While there are corporations that bene-
fit from the resource privilege, the arguments for the extension of this privilege to corrupt or
warmongering governments are not strong, and are unlikely to afford these corporations sub-
stantial support in any attempt to retain the privilege for such governments.
The advantage of the approach of systemic change is that better policies, once effected,
will continue to improve the position of the poor, even without sustained advocacy. While do-
nations might temporarily improve the lives of extremely poor people, and, in the best case,
may lift large numbers of people out of poverty, the bad institutions and disadvantageous poli-
cies that have driven people into poverty will continue to operate, even as donors get fatigued
and turn their attention to new causes. By contrast, institutional reforms that have good effects
will continue to lift people out of poverty, leaving advocacy groups, and people who take se-
riously their duty to assist the poor, free to build upon those good effects with other targeted
reforms.
One strong argument against institutional change is that such measures do not directly as-
sist people at risk. Singer relates an anecdote about a panel discussion featuring the economist
William Easterly and philanthropist Bill Gates at the World Economic Forum in 2007. Easterly
points out that aid given to Africa over the years has not stimulated economic growth; Gates
responds, “I don’t promise when a kid lives it will cause a GNP increase. I think life has value.”103
103ibid., p. 115.
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Humanitarian aid can bring food aid, doctors, and other essentials that save lives in a direct
and measurable way. Institutional reform does not save a dying child or feed a starving family;
there are no dramatic interventions that can be captured in photographs.
It is not hard to see why an aid worker, knowing the perils of aid gone wrong, might pre-
fer to continue working with a broken system, rather than to withdraw and know that suffer-
ing continues, without an attempt being made to alleviate it. But however counter-intuitive it
may be to withdraw aid donations and concentrate on other strategies, considering the poten-
tial ill effects of humanitarian aid in extreme situations, demonstrates why, after much debate,
some aid agencies have chosen to withdraw from particularly difficult situations, just as some
branches of Médecins Sans Frontières did from Rwanda and Zaire in 1995 in response to prob-
lems with the provision of aid in refugee camps. As with the other approaches discussed in this
chapter, the strategy of limiting resource transfers and borrowing privileges has its shortcom-
ings. Nonetheless, following Langlois’s reformulation of Singer’s pond analogy, it may be better
to go to city hall and insist the pond be fenced in, rather than (or in addition to) simply waiting
at the pond to rescue any passing child who falls into it.
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4 Responding to Our Duty
The goal of removing institutional injustices and easing the plight of people trapped by war is
not a trivial one; the current institutional order, like any system, creates winners and losers,
and people who benefit from the system are unlikely to accede to the removal of elements
from which they profit. As a result, while governments, large corporations, and international
organisations may be best-placed to address the institutional rules that encourage conflict, in-
dividuals also have a responsibility to work towards a more just international system. As I have
suggested, concerted advocacy, while a slow mechanism for change, can be effective in over-
turning established rules. There are examples from which we can draw lessons, of unjust rules
that have been addressed or removed, such as implicit support for the corruption and bribery
of foreign officials, or the trading of conflict diamonds.
4.1 Advocating change
This advocacy can take many forms. For example, instead or, or in addition to donating money
to aid agencies, as Singer suggests, we might give to organisations that advocate for change,
or organisations that, like Oxfam, mix advocacy with aid. While there are not as many organ-
isations that advocate for change as there are aid agencies with a presence in conflict zones,
there are prominent groups that work on advocacy issues relating to poverty, such as the Ju-
bilee campaign, which aims to cancel debt for the poorest countries, and Make Poverty History,
which is an umbrella organisation of charities, religious groups, and other coalitions that com-
bat poverty, either through aid or through advocacy.
For those who are unable or unwilling to donate to advocacy groups, there are a variety of
other options. The scale of humanitarian aid operations means that you cannot simply fly into
a war zone and attempt to help people, but it is possible to advocate on your own, as well as
through contributing to groups. You can write to your democratic representatives or govern-
ment officials to argue against unjust international rules or objectionable government policies.
You can organise or sign petitions, to raise awareness of the issue or, if a great many people sign,
to force a rethink of government policy. Organisations like Avaaz can boast millions of mem-
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bers, and, although direct responsibility for policy change cannot always be attributed to their
efforts, it is reasonable to think that governments targeted by petitions listing millions of sig-
natures will be aware of increased public scrutiny. You can also raise awareness and encourage
others to take action, by talking to friends or writing to newspapers.
These sorts of actions can also put pressure on companies that benefit from unjust rules to
reform, or to put in place measures to prevent abuse, much as the diamond industry instituted
the Kimberley Process to prevent countries or rebel organisations that were selling so-called
“conflict diamonds”—diamonds from war zones in Sierra Leone and Liberia in the late 1990s
and early 2000s, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Côte d’Ivoire—from realising
a profit that could drive violence or undermine legitimate governments. The success of the
Kimberley Process has been questioned in recent years, in part due to a lack of political will
by member nations to enforce the protocol’s rules, and because diamonds are only classified as
conflict diamonds when sold by rebel groups; diamonds sold by governments with poor human
rights records—as is the case in Zimbabwe—are not classified as conflict diamonds.104 This
illustrates the difficulty, once international rules have been changed to improve outcomes for
victims of conflict, of enforcing those new rules, but such difficulties do not mean that changing
rules such as the resource privilege is not a worthwhile goal.
There are a number of ways of restructuring both resource and borrowing privileges that
could remove the potential harm. Most directly, people can lobby organisations that buy re-
sources from war-torn countries to instead buy resources from nations at peace. Countries like
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Angola are able to raise a great deal of money from
the sale of resources such as oil and columbite–tantalite. In many cases, these businesses are
prominent, producing products such as cellular telephones that are marketed directly to indi-
viduals. In the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Rwandan army was
alleged, in a report to the UN Security Council, to have exported about 100 tons of columbite–
tantalite per month between 1997 and 2000, earning “at least $250 million over a period of 18
months.”105 They judge that this amount would be “substantial enough to finance the war”, or
104John Eligon, ‘Global Witness Quits Group on "Blood Diamonds"’, New York Times, 5 December 2011, 〈http:
//www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/africa/global-witness-quits-group-on-blood-diamonds.
html〉.
105UN Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
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at least Rwanda’s part in the Congolese conflict.106
In other cases, companies have positions that are at odds with the practical effects of their
resource purchases. American televangelist Pat Robertson, for example, was alleged to have
used planes that were supposed to be transporting relief supplies to Liberia to instead transport
diamond-mining equipment, as part of a deal with then-president of Liberia Charles Taylor
which gave Robertson gold-mining concessions in south-east Liberia.107
Public pressure on companies that buy such resources, engaging with fighters and fund-
ing conflicts, can be effective in forcing reform. Even when the resulting reforms are imper-
fect, as we saw with the Kimberley Process, they can reduce the funding that armed groups can
use to prosecute a war. Similarly, pressure on organisations and corporations that lend money
to armed groups and illegitimate governments can stop such loans from being used to fight a
war, or allowing the redirection of other monies, from health or education budgets, into mil-
itary uses. In addition, public pressure could force organisations that are requiring payment
by newly-democratic governments of past loans, made to undemocratic past governments, to
forgive the loans or recognise the ill effects of loans that should not have been made, and make
recompense.
Pressure can also force governments to change their positions with respect to loans to and
resources bought from illegitimate governments and rebel organisations. Governments can
prohibit or regulate trade between companies based in their country and bad governments,
using tools like sanctions, or by requiring companies to demonstrate that resource purchases
from countries that have illegitimate governments do not lead to arms purchases or increases
in military spending in those countries.
Waging war is expensive. Paul Collier points out that, while the well-funded British Con-
servative Party had revenues of $50 million in an election year, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka had
an annual revenue of $350 million, seven times higher, even in a much smaller country.108 This
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Geneva: United Nations Security Council, 12 April
2001, p. 29.
106ibid., pp. 29–30.
107Anna Schecter, ‘Prosecutor: Pat Robertson Had Gold Deal with African Dictator’, ABC News, 4 Febru-
ary 2010, 〈http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/pat-robertsons-gold-deal-african-dictator/story?
id=9749341〉.
108Collier, op. cit., pp. 133–134.
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suggests that there are a number of ways that third parties might exert a good influence as rebel
organisations and warring governments seek to raise money for their conflict.
This is a small selection of strategies for correcting injustices in current international prac-
tises. Committed advocates may find that other strategies have a greater effect, or may prefer
to lobby not for specific changes, but instead set a general goal of correcting injustice, leaving
the specifics to be determined by policy-makers.
4.2 Objections to activism and advocacy
One might object to this means of fulfilling one’s duty—advocating for change—by arguing that,
although advocacy may be desirable, it will not bring about change for people affected by con-
flict situations, or that the level of involvement that it requires of us is too low to adequately
reflect the importance of the duty to assist people in need. Singer suggests that we give up ev-
erything that is not essential to our well-being—short of sacrificing anything nearly as impor-
tant as the deprivation of the poor—and instead donate those resources to charity. Participating
in low-key activism efforts such as signing petitions, raising awareness, or writing to represen-
tatives may not be as demanding as is required by Singer’s logical formulation of our duty to the
poor.
Singer applies his argument specifically to financial resources, but it is worth considering
how it would apply if we instead gave our time, attempting to raise awareness or volunteering.
It can be difficult to judge what level of financial giving sacrifices something as important as
the lives of people who are dying of poverty; assessing our other resources, such as time, can
be even more difficult. How much leisure time is essential to our well-being? How much time
away from work should we spend with our families, rather than writing letters and lobbying for
change? While it does not usually take much time to write a letter, and even less to sign a pe-
tition, there are other types of engagement that may require a substantially greater investment
of time or resources, such as volunteering, or creating and marketing a petition.
Singer believes that such a demanding standard, giving everything that you can without
sacrificing anything as important as someone’s life, may be too much to ask of people, and he
favours an approach that requires extremely wealthy people to give a moderate portion of their
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income, and well-off people only a small portion, five percent, of their income. In this case,
rather than recommending that individuals give up one day in a week, one day in a month,
or some comparable period, it may be preferable to suggest goals (a petition signed; a letter
written). Some goals may require only a fraction of the time we have spare, not spent providing
for ourselves or our families. Other goals may be more onerous, such as volunteering for or
otherwise contributing to organisations that aim to make a difference in situations of conflict,
or boycotting a company that uses minerals mined in conflict-ridden areas to make desirable
goods such as cellular telephones.
In addition, if we are able to discharge our duty to vulnerable people by raising awareness
of their plight and about what might be done to alleviate it, it is to be hoped that more people
might embrace the duty. And because it is an important duty, high levels of participation are
desirable, likely to have a greater impact than if we require people to sacrifice non-essential
comforts. Petitions may be a relatively weak form of engagement on an issue, but it is also pos-
sible that a petition signed by millions (or even hundreds of thousands) of people, each taking
a few minutes to sign, can have a greater effect than the concerted efforts of a team of dedi-
cated activists. Even petitions that fail to gather sufficient numbers of signatures to force policy
changes can have positive effects on attitudes. Such a petition can encourage new awareness
of an issue, and stimulate new ideas and broader discussions. In cases where policies are de-
cided by commercial interests, it may be the case that even a small number of signatures may
be sufficient to either sway the commercial interests, or to encourage policy-makers to reject
commercial interests that run counter to expressed preferences of their constituents.
If too few people responded to such a duty, signing a petition or embracing a boycott, we
could not necessarily expect any change in attitudes or policies, although a petition that fails
to reach some threshold may still generate media attention and highlight the cause it aims to
advance. A similar problem might occur if we asked people to donate money, and few people
contributed: the difficulty of operating in the midst of a conflict means that, if too few people
donate money to a group that organises relief programmes in war-torn countries, that group
may not be able to continue functioning, or may need to redirect resources from other deserv-
ing areas. However, in principle, a few donations can at least help some people in need, whereas
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if too few people sign a petition to reach the threshold required to enact change, those signa-
tures may seem to be wasted. For this reason, our duty should not simply be to sign petitions,
but requires us to encourage others to join us in agitating for change. Just as one wealthy in-
dividual who donates money can have as great an effect as the donations of a thousand less
wealthy people, one dedicated person can inspire thousands of others to add their voice.
Given the low barrier in signing a petition, it is likely that more people will be willing to
make such a statement than would be willing to donate. We should criticise a person who does
no more than sign a petition for his low level of involvement, and encourage him to engage
with greater enthusiasm—to speak to his representatives in government and write to (or boy-
cott) companies which buy resources that fund conflict, to volunteer for organisations that ad-
dress these issues, and to encourage others to take similar action—but even a minimal level of
engagement can have a meaningful effect when large numbers of people are involved.
4.3 Individual and governmental responsibilities
While donations to charitable organisations are clearly within the scope of individual action,
advocating changes in international institutions may seem more appropriate as a government
responsibility. In the same way that a government is usually held to be responsible for protect-
ing the human rights of its citizens, a government has a broader, albeit more limited, responsi-
bility to the citizens of all countries. It may be limited because rather than ensuring the citizens
of all countries have a right to due process or freedom of association (which may be regarded as
an excessive burden), a government may reasonably be held to have a responsibility to ensure
its laws and rules don’t unduly prejudice or injure non-citizens, beyond the competition that
may be expected between countries operating on a level playing field.
I am sympathetic to the notion that governments are best-placed to bring about changes
in international institutions, but this does not mean that we have no personal, individual duty
to assist people stricken by conflict. To see why, we can examine Singer’s argument, that we
have a duty to the less fortunate that is individual and specific, not necessarily corporate; such
a duty can be discharged by a representative body, but he applies it to individuals rather than
governments. In part, this is because Singer is more concerned with individual moral agency,
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and while three-quarters of international aid comes from governments, individuals can give
money directly to aid agencies as easily as their governments. By contrast, changing interna-
tional rules such as the resource privilege requires collective action on a global scale, at the
level of governments and large international organisations, suggesting that the responsibility
for such changes should rest with governments.
But aid that is donated by democratic governments is usually given explicitly on behalf of
the people they represent. In the same way, international agreements made by a democratic
government should reflect the preferences of its citizens. Because governments are the vehi-
cles through which people can affect international institutions, the ultimate responsibility for
changing unjust institutions does not rest only with governments, but applies equally to the
people they represent.
Governments are often conservative in altering their laws and international agreements;
some legitimate, democratic governments resist duties specified in UN human rights conven-
tions or in international covenants, for example those relating to the status of refugees, even
when those legal duties are widely recognised to have strong moral significance. It may be the
case that the citizens of such a government reject these moral arguments, but some of the time,
citizens may accept the moral argument while doing little to ensure that their government’s
policies follow their ethical beliefs. In such cases, citizens of these countries have a duty to hold
their governments accountable, and to reform unjust rules to which their governments have
acceded, to bring government policies in line with their ethical obligations.
4.4 Conclusion
Conflicts, particularly those which generate large amounts of media coverage and international
attention, attract a great deal of aid from generous donors around the world. However, our
obligation to the people suffering from the violence and deprivation of those conflicts does not
end when we donate some money to a worthy cause.
As we have seen, resources are in great demand in a conflict zone, and the lack of inde-
pendent law-enforcement, combined with an abundance of weapons, means that combatants
are able to control any resources, such as aid, that come into territory that they control. While
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not all fighting groups do deprive non-combatants of their aid supplies, many will do so, or at-
tempt to control the distribution of those supplies in order to best meet their own goals. As a
result, aid can end up prolonging a conflict, providing soldiers with additional food or money,
and worsening the position of victims of the conflict.
This suggests a strong objection to the idea that we have a responsibility to assist victims of
conflict by giving humanitarian aid: if the aid hurts more than it helps, a reasonable response
is to refrain from giving aid. This may not help people in need, but it avoids hurting them even
further. However, a better response is to look for other means of helping people trapped by
conflict which do not risk making their positions worse.
Initially, I have argued, this should take the form of restricting the sale of minerals and
other resources by rebels and governments at war, as well as their ability to borrow money,
where these resources are used to fight the conflict. This may take the form of a blanket ban,
or of some mechanism designed to ensure the proceeds are used to benefit all citizens of that
country, without allowing the government to redirect existing resources into other channels
such as military spending.
In the best case scenario arising from the solutions I have examined, where the most dam-
aging international rules have been changed for the better, some wars may be avoided and oth-
ers may be shortened, but not all conflicts will be eliminated. This does not mean that our duty
to victims of conflict would have been discharged by effecting policy changes: the suffering of
people affected by new and ongoing conflicts would still prompt a response from us.
The most appropriate response in such situations might take the form of sanctions, or of
some form of military intervention. There may be other important policy changes that can as-
sist in this goal, or that can rectify some of the problems that limit or overturn the good effects
of aid. For example, at present in Syria, United Nations aid is required to be distributed ac-
cording to rules set by the Syrian government, which means that little of the aid goes to needy
people in rebel-controlled areas.109 In this case, it may prove beneficial to change UN rules to
empower some neutral third party to allocate aid, rather than a government who may have a
109David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘In Parts of Syria, Lack of Assistance "Is a Catastrophe"’, New
York Times, 8 March 2013, 〈http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/middleeast/
in-syrias-rebel-strongholds-foreign-aid-yields-anger.html〉.
56
stake in manipulating aid flows. It may be that aid can be an important component of any as-
sistance, not just in helping stabilise a post-conflict peace, but in helping victims during a war,
in places where it is possible to avoid the most common pitfalls of such aid, and where we can
be reasonably certain that the aid is reaching its intended recipients. But in situations where
aid can be manipulated or used to continue a conflict, we should ensure that in helping victims
of conflict, we don’t make their position worse.
57
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